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INTRODUCTION 
There’s no such thing as a free lunch.1  There’s also no such 
thing as free trade.  But there is freer trade.  Indeed, the last few 
decades have seen an almost universal movement towards 
enhanced trade agreements, both among regional blocs and on a 
global basis.  The United States has been an enthusiastic 
participant regionally, e.g., as a member economy of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) and the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (“APEC”), and globally, e.g., as a member 
of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) and a signatory to its 
many agreements, including the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (“GATT”) and the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (“TRIPs”).2 
 
1 MILTON FRIEDMAN, THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS A FREE LUNCH (Open Court 1975); 
ROBERT A. HEINLEIN, THE MOON IS A HARSH MISTRESS 162 (1966) (“There ain’t no such 
thing as a free lunch”).  Both authors helped popularize the expression, which dates to at 
least the 1930’s. Milton Friedman, Wikiquote, http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Milton_ 
Friedman (last visited October 11, 2006). 
 2 The gradual global progress toward free trade began in the United States in the 
1930’s when Franklin Roosevelt introduced the Trade Agreements Program.  
International negotiations and agreements have always been a seminal component of the 
U.S. initiative. See Paul Krugman, Enemies of the WTO: Bonus Arguments Against the 
World Trade Organization, SLATE, November 24, 1999, available at 
http://www.slate.com/id/56497.  See also WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
UNDERSTANDING THE WTO—PRINCIPLES OF THE TRADING SYSTEM (2004), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm. 
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The fundamental objective of these trade agreements is clear 
and praiseworthy—to enhance the efficiency of markets, thereby 
creating more competitive and profitable industries and better 
values for consumers.  It has generally been understood that there 
have been and will continue to be certain unavoidable adjustments 
of labor activity as the larger markets rationalize.  However, there 
has been a growing and increasingly significant concern in the 
United States that many jobs are disappearing as work is being 
outsourced, not simply as an adjustment to changing markets but to 
markets that are being skewed by foreign and, in some cases, 
domestic laws or jurisprudence, which may not fully or adequately 
reflect the increasingly international nature of the industries 
affected by these laws. 
I. BACKGROUND: GLOBALIZATION AND 
THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
The outsourcing of jobs and technology is a particularly 
sensitive issue facing the U.S. economy today.  The drug 
development activities of the U.S. pharmaceutical industry offer an 
instructive case study to contextualize the situation. The U.S. 
pharmaceutical industry is one of the most productive and 
competitive industries in the world.  Pharmaceutical research is an 
activity of utmost importance to this country.  Sustaining its 
growth in the United States is considered fundamental to both the 
health care system and the economy. Outsourcing threatens to 
move the drug development segment of this industry and its 
technology and jobs outside of the United States. 
Over the last quarter century, a multinational diffusion of 
individual pharmaceutical firms has rendered the term the “U.S. 
pharmaceutical industry” a misnomer.3  Multinational firms are 
becoming the norm.  Most large U.S.-based firms now have 
extensive facilities in foreign markets and many foreign-based 
 
 3 THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING, THE COMPETITIVE STATUS OF THE U.S. 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: THE INFLUENCES OF TECHNOLOGY IN DETERMINING 
INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 21 (1983). 
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firms have extensive operations in the United States.4  The 
intensely competitive nature of this “globalized” pharmaceutical 
industry makes product innovation and development a crucial 
determinant of any company’s success, inside or outside the United 
States. 
Pharmaceutical companies today are challenged by the time 
and cost required to bring novel, branded drug products, i.e., the 
so-called “pioneer” drugs, successfully to market.  Companies 
must continually seek new and improved ways to expedite the 
research, development and regulatory approval phases of drug 
development, all the while without compromising the integrity of 
the process itself.5  The extent and vitality of this innovation is a 
drug company’s most valued resource.  Evaluating and 
ameliorating the way drug research is conducted and funding that 
research by product sales or licensing are essential to maintaining a 
competitive advantage in the globalized pharmaceutical industry.6 
Intellectual property (“IP”) rights inherently affect the nature of 
global competition.  Industries that do not enjoy the protection of 
IP rights, or where such protection is limited in scope or in term by 
a country’s legal landscape or by rapid development of new 
products, find themselves involved in intense competition that 
lowers their profits and stifles future investment.  By contrast, in 
industries or countries where IP rights protect product sales for 
extended periods of time, there is limited competition, prices are 
less economically sensitive and profits are higher.  Most 
importantly, companies are willing to invest significant amounts of 
their revenues in research on future products.  If a company or 
 
 4 According to a United Nations agency, in the early 1990’s there were 37,000 
international companies with 175,000 foreign subsidiaries.  By 2003, there were 64,000 
international companies with 870,000 subsidiaries. A Taxing Battle, THE ECONOMIST, 
Jan. 29, 2004, available at http://www.economist.com/finance/displayStory.cfm?story_ 
id=2388628. 
 5 See generally Jacques-Pierre Moreau, Pharma Companies Must Shift Focus to 
R&D Efforts, BOSTON BUSINESS JOURNAL, Mar. 11, 2005, available at 
http://www.bizjournals.com/boston/stories/2005/03/14/focus2.html. 
 6 In other countries, strategies such as rigid price controls and regulations have 
virtually killed such innovation.  See, e.g., Joseph H. Golec & John A. Vernon, What’s at 
Stake in Pharmaceutical Reimportation: The Costs in Terms of Life Years, Lives, and 
Dollars, 16 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 135, 135–137 (2005). 
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industry as a whole is unable to (a) adequately protect and exploit 
its own IP and (b) gain appropriate access to essential IP owned by 
other companies or industries, then its overall functioning will be 
significantly impeded in the global economy. 
A strong patent system is a supremely important mechanism 
for encouraging and fostering pharmaceutical and biomedical 
research, drug development, drug products, investments and 
ultimately jobs.  The owners of patents can exclude others from 
making, using or selling the patented inventions.7  This allows 
them to gain economic benefit from their inventions and to fund 
future improvements.  Successful pharmaceutical firms and the 
drug research industry at large have strategically harnessed the 
burgeoning nature of scientific discovery by patenting their IP to 
form intangible assets.  These intangible assets are valuable 
corporate assets that can make up a great portion of the total worth 
of a company.8 
Thomas Friedman, the Foreign Affairs columnist for The New 
York Times, was among the first to recognize that the value of 
these intangible assets would only increase following a 
globalization of the industry.9  He also recognized that capital, 
which is drawn to markets rapidly by opportunities, or even 
perceived opportunities, will abandon those same markets just as 
quickly.10  It follows, therefore, that companies in the drug arena 
should patent their useful inventions borne of drug research, as 
early and as often as possible so as to maintain a competitive 
 
 7 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2001). 
 8 In successful organizations, IP holdings and other intangible assets constitute two to 
three times the value of physical assets.  During 2000, the market-to-book ratios of 
Fortune 500 companies increased to 6.3 to 1, indicating that for every dollar of physical 
assets on the balance sheet, the market recognized $6.30 worth of other intangible assets.  
Lesley Craig & Lindsay Moore, Intangible Assets, Intellectual Capital Or Property? It 
Does Make A Difference, FRONT RANGE TECH BIZ, Feb. 3, 2002, available at 
http://www.klminc.com/articles/frt_feb02.html. 
 9 See generally Thomas L. Friedman, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE: 
UNDERSTANDING GLOBALIZATION (First Anchor Books) (2000) (defining intangible assets 
as the knowledge-based competence of a company and arguing throughout that 
“intangible asset companies” will succeed over “tangible asset companies” in generating 
profits in a globalized economy) (1999). 
 10 See generally id., at ch. 1. 
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advantage (or even the perception of a competitive advantage) in 
the globalized pharmaceutical industry.  In this sense, patent 
protection has become inseparable from contemporary globalized 
capitalism in the area of pharmaceuticals and their discovery and 
development. 
In order to have value, however, patents must provide effective 
economic benefit.  Today, for U.S. drug companies that benefit is 
impacted by the U.S. patent system and to an increasing degree by 
the patent systems of countries around the world.  Companies must 
manage and leverage their patent portfolios to garner financial 
benefits and competitive advantages in the global marketplace.  A 
strong portfolio can, for example, support future revenue streams, 
erect barriers to competition, and enhance a company’s perceived 
value to outside investors, partners and acquirers.11  The degree to 
which companies can strategically capitalize upon the value of 
their own patented technology depends in part on the patent 
landscape, country by country, and the degree to which they can 
obtain access to patents held by others.  Any comprehensive 
business strategy should be informed by competitive IP 
intelligence.12  Because the parameters of IP rights are conceptual 
in nature, however, the extent to which a company can exclude 
others from infringing upon its intellectual space (i.e., using these 
intangible assets without permission) is much more uncertain than 
in the case of trespassing upon real property. 
This paper will argue that U.S. patent jurisprudence should 
embrace rather than fight the phenomenon of globalization, i.e., the 
integration of capital, technology, and information across national 
borders, in a way that creates a single global market.13  Patent 
infringement jurisprudence in the United States should not promote 
the outsourcing of a pharmaceutical firm’s most valuable business 
assets or jobs.  The U.S. patent system should allow U.S.-based 
 
 11 Bill Barrett & Dave Crawford, Integrating the Intellectual Property Value Chain, 20 
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY BE43–BE46 (2002). 
 12 Id. 
 13 See Thomas L. Friedman, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE: UNDERSTANDING 
GLOBALIZATION (2000), available at http://www.thomaslfriedman.com/ 
lexusolivetree.htm (defining globalization). 
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pharmaceutical companies a wide enough berth to leverage their 
intangible assets within a global framework while also allowing 
scientific innovation to continue both at home and abroad.14 
Part II will provide an overview of the U.S. patent system and 
the scope of patent protection for the pharmaceutical industry in 
the United States.  It will outline the tension between the patent 
laws and free market forces and will review the scope of patent 
infringement under United States law.  It will provide an overview 
of the legal basis of patent infringement for drug research under 
both the common law and the Patent Laws of the United States.15 It 
will then introduce the legal conflict with regard to the debate over 
the breadth of patent protection and infringement across the 
pharmaceutical and research tool industries. 
Part III of this paper will address U.S. court decisions in the 
context of early stage pharmaceutical drug research and patent 
infringement.  It will examine the conflict that has arisen based on 
a limited reading of the common law research exemption and the 
resulting development of the more broadly-read “safe harbor” 
research exemption to patent infringement in the context of drug 
development.  It will address the laws that regulate patent 
infringement through importation and will consider the most recent 
positions of the United States Supreme Court and the United States 
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals (“Federal Circuit”) in cases that 
reflect the current state of early stage drug research and patent 
infringement in the United States. 
Part IV of this paper will explore the legal climate for 
outsourcing early stage drug research to other jurisdictions.  
Specifically, it will consider the most recent positions that non-
U.S. courts have taken with regard to the proper judicial treatment 
 
 14 While not the main topic of this paper, some accommodation must also be given to 
the developers of research tools. See infra note 22 and accompanying text.  These tools 
make important contributions to drug research.  Any set of patent infringement decisions 
that devalues them will reduce the likelihood that the research tool industry will grow.  
This will disadvantage drug development in the long term.  Individual countries cannot 
affect the value of these tools in the global marketplace.  The solution can only be a 
global one. See discussion infra Part V. 
 15 Bryson Act, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.) 
[hereinafter The Patent Act]. 
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of research exemptions to patent infringement in the context of 
drug development.  It will review the laws of Canada, the 
European Community and India, in the context of the research 
exemption for drug development.  It will also examine how 
countries outside the U.S. are addressing the problem as a way of 
considering whether or not their decisions are encouraging the 
outsourcing of U.S. early stage drug research. 
Part V will draw together the effects of these diverse 
jurisprudences on the patent infringement consequences of early 
stage drug research and the outsourcing debate in the United 
States.  It will argue that current U.S. jurisprudence is forcing U.S. 
drug companies to outsource their early stage drug research.  It will 
also present International Trade Commission (ITC) considerations, 
such as the possibility of it exercising unfair competition 
jurisdiction if outsourcing involves patented U.S. technology.  The 
paper concludes by discussing possible solutions for the quagmire 
that recent U.S. decisions have created in outsourcing jobs and 
technology in early stage drug research. 
In sum, a balanced solution is needed.  In order to de-
incentivize drug companies from outsourcing their early stage 
research from the United States, the 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) safe 
harbor research exception may well need to be expanded, by the 
Courts or the legislature, to include such early stage drug 
discovery.  However, at the same time, the research tool industry 
will need to be compensated for this shift, possibly through 
corporate goodwill programs or by revitalizing the unfair 
competition law.  The benefits and drawbacks of these possible 
solutions will be discussed. 
II. PATENT PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES 
An unresolved tension exists between the two purposes of the 
U.S. patent system: to disseminate information to the public on one 
hand and to reward innovation on the other.  The benefit of public 
disclosure is clear in that it allows other innovators to build upon 
and to advance technological development.  The value of 
rewarding patent holders with limited exclusive rights to protect 
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their discoveries is also clear in that it allows the proprietor to 
recoup his or her costs for inventing while also creating future 
incentives to invest resources to develop and commercialize new 
technology.  However, a delicate balance exists between these 
costs and benefits.  Companies must engage in value chain 
analyses in order to properly manage the huge investments that 
must be made in order to galvanize new discoveries, develop 
meaningful technology and remain competitive in the world 
economy.16  As stated by Abraham Lincoln, himself a patentee: 
“The patent system added the fuel of interest to the fire of 
genius.”17 
Under this public-private (i.e., disclosure-for-protection) 
bargain between the inventor and the government, a patent confers 
a limited, yet potentially very lucrative, monopoly.  A patent 
owner’s right to exclude is guaranteed by the property right that 
inheres in a patent.  A violation of the patent’s exclusivity rights 
constitutes patent infringement.  Patent infringement in the United 
States is the unauthorized making, using, selling, offering to sell or 
importing of a patented invention, during the term of the patent.18  
During this period of exclusivity, a patent owner can therefore 
legally prohibit another from using the patented technologies (i.e., 
enjoin the infringing activity) or can demand payment for such 
infringing use through royalties or other consideration.19  
Additionally, a patent owner in today’s globalized economy can 
 
 16 The IP value chain starts with the inventor’s original idea and has value added by a 
series of steps that ultimately yields a legally protected asset. Barrett, supra note 11. 
 17 Quoted in HERBERT F. SCHWARTZ, PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 3 (BNA Books 2003) 
(1988). 
 18 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2001). 
 19 The financial consideration for such use can come in almost any form as agreed by 
the parties and can provide a third party with either exclusive or non-exclusive rights to 
use a patent.  Typical financial considerations include periodic fees upon sale of a 
product or process (royalties), up-front fees (typically due at execution of a license 
agreement), flat fees or milestone payments (due at certain agreed upon benchmarks 
during pre-commercialization), reimbursements (e.g., of patent costs), and sometimes 
equity or other compensation in any technology developed through the use of the patent. 
See, e.g., JOHNS HOPKINS TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE, 
(2003) available at http://www.ltd.jhu.edu/about/ipbooklet.html.  But cf. eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (holding that a patentee who prevails in 
an infringement case is not automatically entitled to a permanent injunction). 
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also benefit from the ability to assign the patent property or even 
the royalty payments for the rights to use a patent from one 
member of a corporate family to another (e.g., subsidiary to parent 
within a multinational company) by means of transfer pricing.20 
The language of section 271(a) makes clear that any one of the 
enumerated activities (making, using, selling, offering to sell or 
importing) is actionable as patent infringement.  The patentee does 
not even need to have any evidence of damage or lost profits to 
bring an infringement action.21  The statute does not make clear, 
however, whether the accused activities must be commercial.  This 
leads to one question underlying this paper: Should actionable 
infringement activities be limited to commercial activities or 
should the patent holder also be allowed to bar others from using 
the patented technology for research purposes? 
In the pharmaceutical industry there are two general categories 
of patents.  Both are critical to the development of new drugs.  The 
first category of patents is directed to the research and 
development of the new drug.  These patents seek to capitalize 
upon the so-called “research tools” used in the drug industry.22  
Research tool patents typically include drug targets, cell lines, 
transgenic animals, drug screening assays, intermediates, databases 
and large libraries of potential drugs.  These patents are not 
typically infringed by the marketing of the ultimate drug product.23  
They are only used in research towards finding and developing the 
drug product.  In practice, these patents are usually held by smaller 
 
 20 Transfer pricing refers to internal corporate pricing schemes used for goods and 
services that are traded internally between the divisions of a single multilateral 
corporation.  This is a highly regulated practice because the choice of transfer prices 
affects the division of the total profits and thus the taxable income among related 
corporate entities.  The U.S. tax law’s application of an arm’s length standard to 
transactions involving the exploitation of intangible assets only serves to further 
incentivize companies to outsource a company’s value added activities. See Gustafson et 
al., TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS 625, 660 (West Group Publishing 
2001). 
 21 Roche Prod. v. Bolar Pharm., 733 F.2d 858, 861 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (citations omitted). 
 22 A research tool is any item or method useful in conducting experiments in a research 
setting. See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (defining “research tool” 
as “a term often given to inventions used to conduct research”). 
 23 But see infra note 25 and accompanying text. 
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biotechnology companies and research institutions that actively 
seek to out license the technology to finance the development of 
other research tools or to finance their expansion and ability to 
bring a branded pharmaceutical to market. 
By contrast, the second general category of patents held in the 
pharmaceutical industry is directed to the marketed drug product or 
methods of using it.  These patents typically cover brand name 
pioneer drugs and their uses, e.g., for specific indications.  Pioneer 
drug patents include: 
(1) product patents that cover the active ingredient or 
compound in a drug; (2) process patents that cover a 
process for manufacturing a drug; (3) method-of-use 
patents that relate to a particular method of using a drug; 
and (4) formulation patents that cover both the active and 
inactive ingredients in a drug (e.g. a final dosage form 
tablet or capsule).24 
These types of patents are infringed by the sale and use of the 
ultimate drug product itself.  In practice, these patents are usually 
owned by large pharmaceutical firms that have the resources to 
bring the drugs to market and to distribute them to consumers 
globally. 
An ongoing debate within the drug development industry exists 
concerning the extent to which companies should be allowed to 
operate within the scope of someone else’s research tool patents in 
order to develop new drugs.  This debate has two facets.  On the 
one hand, the developers of the research tools and owners of the 
patents on those tools want those using the tools to pay royalties 
for their use.  Research tool companies would prefer that these 
royalties “reach through” to the sales of the drug product 
discovered through use of the tool.25  This segment of the industry 
 
 24 Daniela Bassan, In Cipro We Trust: But How Do We Feel About Our Drug Patent 
Laws?, in FOOD AND DRUG LAW: AN ELECTRONIC BOOK OF STUDENT PAPERS (Peter 
Barton Hutt ed. 2002), available at http://leda.law.harvard.edu/leda/data/496/ 
Bassan.html. 
 25 The goal of “reach through” claims is to have the patent apply to the ultimate product 
that is sold so as to collect royalties from that sale or to preserve for the patent owner the 
sole right to develop the product.  However, courts have cast doubt on the patentability 
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argues that research tool patents need to be protected by the patent 
laws and the courts because infringement of research tool patents is 
common and there is little a patentee can do to benefit from their 
patents, once the research has been completed.26  Research tool 
companies argue that without the ability to garner such economic 
benefit from their inventions, drug research will suffer and new 
tools will not be developed. 
On the other hand, drug developers argue that having to obtain 
permission to use the many possible research tools potentially 
relevant to the development of a particular drug before 
development starts and to burden ultimate product sales with 
royalties for their use is economically unfeasible.  Productivity is 
the key challenge in the highly competitive drug development 
industry and success is measured by time-to-market.27  This 
segment of the industry argues that immediate access to useful 
research information is a crucial component of any drug 
development platform.28  Pharmaceutical drug developers argue 
that research tool patents impose significant transaction costs that 
 
and enforcement of claims to products identified only by reference to the material or 
means used to find or identify them. See, e.g., Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 
358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004), reh’g en banc denied, 375 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2004), 
cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1015 (2004) (holding a patent directed to methods of selectively 
inhibiting certain enzyme activity did not sufficiently describe a compound [Celebrex®] 
that functioned by that mechanism); Housey Pharms., Inc. v. Astrazeneca UK Ltd., 366 
F.3d 1348, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (affirming judgment of patent invalidity based on lower 
court’s broad construction of “inhibitor or activator” of a protein to include an indirect 
pathway-binding mechanism); Bayer AG v. Housey Pharms., Inc., 340 F.3d 1367, 1368 
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (finding no patent infringement where the physical goods were 
manufactured from information generated by the patented process).  But see Ariad 
Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., Civil Action No. 02-11280-RWZ (D. Mass. 2006); see 
also infra note 142 and accompanying text. 
 26 See John P. Walsh et al., Working Through the Patent Problem, 299 SCIENCE 1021 
(2003). 
 27 See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text.  The “time-to-market” describes the 
general length of time that it takes to get a drug product from concept to the marketplace.  
A reduced time-to-market is a significant competitive advantage in the pharmaceutical 
industry because a pioneer drug can confer significant market power. Id.  But cf. Ill. Tool 
Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281, 1291 (2006) (holding that patents alone 
do not confer a presumption of market power). 
 28 See generally Walsh et al., supra note 26. 
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will delay and possibly prevent future drug development.29  This is 
because of the need to either negotiate many license agreements in 
advance of beginning the research, or else to proceed at the risk of 
substantial damages when the product is launched.30 
Recent U.S. court decisions, on the scope of the common law 
research exemption as well as the so-called “safe harbor” research 
exemption to patent infringement, have tried to split the baby.31  
They support research tool patents in early stage drug research and 
they support the drug developers in the later drug development and 
approval stages.32  This compromise is out of step with the laws 
and jurisprudence of other countries.33  It, therefore, has 
disadvantaged U.S.-based pharmaceutical firms in their attempts to 
develop drugs for the global market in the United States.  The U.S. 
decisions, for example, have placed significant limitations on 
domestic research operations by holding that certain types of 
patents related to upstream, early stage discoveries, such as 
methods of screening, mechanism of action and targets for drug 
intervention, may be infringed in early stage drug research.34 
That jurisprudence, when coupled with another series of U.S. 
decisions permitting the importation and use of information and 
products developed in early stage research conducted outside the 
U.S., may have the perhaps unintended and unanticipated effect of 
forcing U.S.-based firms to outsource their early stage drug 
research.35  Outsourcing, in this context, means that 
pharmaceutical firms would move early stage drug discovery 
research and its associated technologies and jobs outside the 
United States and have either foreign subsidiaries or third parties in 
another country (or countries) perform the research and then 
reintegrate the results of that research back into the U.S. operations 
of the U.S.-based company.  Jurisprudence that encourages such 
outsourcing is a legitimate cause of concern for those involved in 
 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). 
 32 See discussion infra Parts III.A., III.B. 
 33 See discussion infra Part IV. 
 34 See infra notes 114–119 and accompanying text. 
 35 See discussion infra Part III.C. 
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the pharmaceutical and regulatory industries in the United States 
and to the U.S. economy at large.  The next part will review the 
evolution of the common law research exemption and the “safe 
harbor” research exemption to patent infringement in the context 
of the pharmaceutical industry. 
III. EXEMPTIONS FROM PATENT INFRINGEMENT 
IN THE UNITED STATES 
The use of a patented invention in research falls into a slightly 
different camp from that of patent infringement for commercial 
activities, as it involves the use of an invention solely for 
experimental purposes, such as testing whether a compound 
functions as claimed, re-creating a process to observe its effects 
from a scientific perspective, and using a patented research tool in 
drug discovery.36  Some of these activities, indeed, are the raison 
d’être of the patent system—to encourage early publication so that 
others can improve upon the invention.37  Other activities are not 
really about improving the patented invention but about using it in 
research for its intended use to develop other inventions.  This 
distinction is reflected in the research exemption to patent 
infringement in many countries.  For example, Canada, the 
European Community, and India have carved out varying degrees 
of exemptions from infringement for “experimental use” on patents 
by third parties.38  The situation in the United States is somewhat 
more complicated, as there exists a common law as well as a 
statutory research exemption to patent infringement, both with 
shifting standards of interpretation and somewhat tortured 
jurisprudential histories.39 
 
 36 Tom Saunders, Renting Space on the Shoulders of Giants: Madey and the Future of 
the Experimental Use Doctrine, 113 YALE L.J. 261, 261 (2003). 
 37 See id. at 262. 
 38 See discussion infra Parts IV.A., IV.B., IV.C. 
 39 See discussion infra Parts III.A., III.B. 
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A. The Common Law Exemption from Patent Infringement 
United States jurisprudence has interpreted the common law 
exemption, or the experimental use defense, to liability for 
infringement rather narrowly.  The common law exemption 
originated in the early days of patent law as an exemption for 
“philosophical experiments, or for the purpose of ascertaining the 
sufficiency of the machine to produce its described effects”.40  
Following these holdings, courts have consistently carved out a 
narrow exemption to patent infringement for experimental 
activities that have no commercial purpose.  The sliver of this 
carving was established in Spray Refrigeration Co. v. Sea Spray 
Fishing, Inc.41 where the Court found infringement for the 
experimental use of a freezing apparatus on a commercial fishing 
boat.  Even though the Court acknowledged that the operators of 
the boat were using the freezing method experimentally, 
infringement was deemed to have occurred because it took place 
without a license on board a boat that was engaged in commercial 
fishing operations.42  An experimental use coupled with a 
commercial use, therefore, even if de minimis, constitutes patent 
infringement.43 
Despite this ruling, patent infringement defendants continue to 
seek protection of the experimental use and the de minimis use 
exemptions concomitantly.  Courts, indeed, have clarified the de 
minimis defense with regard to patent infringement by holding it 
akin to the experimental use defense.  The Court of Claims in 
Douglas v. United States, for example, stated that the experimental 
use defense is just “an expression of the maxim de minimis non 
curat lex.” 44  This construction has served to limit even further the 
common law or experimental use exemption in the United States.  
 
 40 Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600); see 
also Poppenhusen v. Falke, 19 F. Cas. 1048, 1049 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No. 11,279) 
(exempting experiments with a patented article which are “for the sole purpose of 
gratifying a philosophical taste, or for curiosity, or for mere amusement”). 
 41 322 F.2d 34, 37 (9th Cir. 1963). 
 42 Id. 
 43 See id. at 36. 
 44 181 U.S.P.Q. 170, 177 (Ct. Cl. Trial Div. 1974), aff’d, 206 Ct. Cl. 96 (Ct. Cl. 1975) 
(“The law does not concern itself with trifles.”). 
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In fact, courts often question whether any infringing use of a patent 
can be de minimis.  The Federal Circuit’s Judge Rader, for 
example, opined that since the Patent Act confers the right to 
preclude “use” and not “substantial use,” it affirmatively precludes 
de minimis excuses.45  Only somewhat more leniently, the court in 
Deuterium Corp. v. United States, held that “[d]amages for an 
extremely small infringing use may be de minimis, but 
infringement is not a question of degree.”46  This latter rationale 
has been used to support the view that the common law research 
exemption should not itself be considered a true exemption from 
infringement but rather a means to provide limited damages for de 
minimis infringement.47 
Subsequent cases have supported this strict view of 
infringement and the limited defenses thereto.  No activity that 
furthers a commercial purpose of any sort qualifies for the 
protection under the common law research exemption in the 
United States.  For example, in Embrex, Inc. v. Service 
Engineering Corp.,48 plaintiff Embrex was the exclusive licensee 
of a patented method for immunizing birds against disease in ovo 
(in egg) and was practicing this patent commercially in large scale 
industrial chicken farms.  Defendant Service Engineering Corp. 
(“SEC”) used the patented method in an attempt to design around 
it and to build its own inoculating machine.49  Embrex sued and 
SEC contended it was performing scientific experiments that did 
not result in any sale, and therefore its actions were either de 
minimis, or exempt under the experimental use exception.50  The 
Federal Circuit affirmed the trial court’s refusal to set aside the 
 
 45 Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Rader, J., 
concurring). 
 46 19 Cl. Ct. 624, 631 (Cl. Ct. 1990). 
 47 See, e.g., Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003), 
as corrected, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 27796, at *8 (Fed. Cir. 2003), vacated and 
remanded by Merck KgaA v. Integra LifeSciences I Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005). 
 48 216 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. at 1349. 
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jury’s verdict of infringement.51  In its ruling, the Federal Circuit 
reiterated that even the slightest commercial implication will 
render the experimental use exemption (and the de minimis use 
exemption, for that matter) inapplicable.52 
Despite its avowed narrowness, the experimental use 
exemption was for a time presumed by some to exist at academic 
research universities and other not-for-profit organizations.  
However, the law has made clear that this is not the case.  A trial 
court denied the existence of a university qua university research 
exemption in Infigen Inc. v. Advanced Cell Technology Inc.53  
There, the experimental use exemption was denied for work done 
in university research laboratories using patented technology as 
controls, on the basis that “it is up to Congress to decide whether 
there should be an infringement exemption for university-based 
research laboratories. So far, Congress has not seen fit to grant 
one.”54 
In Madey v. Duke University, a landmark decision that once 
and for all ended the experimental use exemption in the context of 
the non-profit entity carrying out allegedly infringing commercial 
activities, the Federal Circuit reached a similar conclusion.55  In 
this case, Dr. John Madey, a scientist and former professor at Duke 
University, claimed that Duke had engaged in the unauthorized use 
of his patent protected lab equipment and sued Duke for 
infringement.56  The District Court granted summary judgment in 
favor of Duke, holding that Duke’s use of the equipment was for 
experimental, non-commercial purposes.57  However, on appeal, 
the Federal Circuit enunciated once again a narrow reading of the 
 
 51 “While SEC tries to cloak these tests in the guise of scientific inquiry, that alone 
cannot immunize its acts . . . Just because SEC was unsuccessful in selling its machines 
does not confer infringement immunity upon SEC for its infringing acts.” Id. 
 52 Id. at 1353 (Rader, J., concurring). 
 53 65 F. Supp. 2d 967 (W.D. Wis. 1999). 
 54 Id. at 981 (citing, e.g., the Patent Competitiveness and Technological Innovation Act 
of 1990, H.R. 5598, 101st Cong. (1990), “which was never passed but which, [inter alia,] 
proposed exemptions from infringement liability for university research”). 
 55 307 F.3d 1351, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958 (2003). 
 56 Duke had used a laser gun, developed and patented by Dr. Madey, for its intended 
purpose as a research tool, not to use or study the gun itself. Id. at 1353. 
 57 Id. at 1355–56. 
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common law research exemption and held that because a research 
university’s goals were inherently commercial in nature, its non-
profit status was irrelevant; Duke was, therefore, not exempt from 
infringement qua university.58  This decision has further cabined 
the common law research exemption even in the context of 
scientific research performed at academic institutions. 
The Federal Circuit’s Judge Pauline Newman has taken issue 
with this fettering of the experimental use doctrine.  She restated 
her dissatisfaction with the Madey decision and the narrow 
research exemption it embraced in a forceful and compelling 
dissent in Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA.59  There, she 
argued that a narrowing of the common law exemption is “ill-
suited to today’s research-founded, technology-based economy.”60  
In her view, the patent system is designed to promote the progress 
of science.61  That goal cannot be achieved if all uses of a patented 
invention are forbidden until the patent expires.  A common law 
research exemption must exist, therefore, to facilitate further 
knowledge and understanding of what the patentee has done in 
order to understand the patented invention, to improve upon it, to 
find a new use for it, or to modify or design around it.62  If such 
research were subject to infringement prohibition, the patentee 
would effectively be granted a de facto monopoly enabling him or 
her to bar not only patent-protected competition, but also all 
research-based efforts to improve, evaluate, compare, challenge or 
avoid the patented technology.63  Such jurisprudence, in Judge 
Newman’s view, would stifle technological advancement and run 
 
 58 Id. at 1362–63 (explaining that research activities are infringing if they further the 
institution’s business objectives of educating and enlightening students, increasing the 
status of the institution and luring lucrative research grants, students and faculty). 
 59 331 F.3d 860, 872–78 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in 
part).  In Integra LifeSciences I, Merck was using patented products to develop the “best” 
drug for the treatment of cancer. Id. at 861. 
 60 Id. as corrected, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 27796, at *35 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 61 Id. at *46.  Her philosophy is derived from the United States Constitution, which 
expressly grants Congress the legislative power “to promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 62 Integra Lifesciences, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 27796 at *42. 
 63 See id. at *45. 
HELM_FORMATTED_AUTHEDITS_102706 10/30/2006  11:39:20 AM 
2006 INFRINGEMENT JURISPRUDENCE AND DRUGS 171 
 
counter to the framework of patent law, which both contemplates 
and facilitates research into patented subject matter.64 
Ultimately, Judge Newman recognized that a narrow tight rope 
must be walked in order to preserve the patentee’s incentive to 
innovate (which is secured by the patent’s right to exclude) while 
also fostering the creation of new knowledge using the patent as 
the stepping off point.  To balance these two societal needs, Judge 
Newman reasoned that the boundary of the common law research 
exemption must lie somewhere in between the generally 
distinguishable phases of “research” and “development.”65 
The development phase of drug discovery, referred to by Judge 
Newman, had previously been addressed in Roche Products v. 
Bolar Pharmaceutical Co.66  This seminal case involved the 
limitations of the common law research exemption in the context 
of generic drugs.67  This case involved a suit between a large 
research-oriented pharmaceutical company (Roche) and a 
manufacturer of generic drugs (Bolar).68  Roche sought to enjoin 
Bolar from using its domestically patented drug, which Bolar had 
obtained from a foreign manufacturer, to conduct the federally 
mandated tests necessary to market, after expiration of the patent, a 
 
 64 Id. at *43–45. 
 65 Id. at *45.  Judge Rader’s majority opinion hastily dismissed this dissent by noting 
that this exemption was not before the court in this case and, even if it were, the Patent 
Act does not include the word “experimental,” let alone an experimental use exemption 
from infringement. Id. at *43 n.2. 
 66 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 856 (1984). 
 67 A general distinction in the drug industry exists between research-based 
pharmaceutical firms that invest heavily in the research and development of original 
products (i.e. brand-name pioneer drugs), and generic drug companies that do typically 
not engage in novel research but instead copy the active ingredient in already approved 
pioneer drugs to bring a competing non-brand-name product to market.  These generic 
products, also called “copycat” or “me-too” drugs, are the bioequivalent of the branded 
products and can be marketed at lower prices because their manufacturers do not incur 
the costs associated with the creation and marketing of pioneer drugs. Moreover, generic 
drug companies can target only the most successful products on the market.  This again 
reduces their costs because they do not spend monies or effort on less successful 
products. See generally United States v. Generix Drug Corp., 460 U.S. 453, 454–60 
(1983). 
 68 Roche Products, 733 F.2d 858. 
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generic drug equivalent to Roche’s brand name drug.69  The 
District Court held that Bolar’s “experimental” testing was not 
infringement because the use was de minimis and experimental.70  
The Federal Circuit reversed, however, stating that the 
experimental use exemption is truly narrow and cannot be 
expanded to encompass tests, demonstrations or experiments that 
further legitimate business interests and thus clearly serve 
commercial purposes.71 
Bolar argued that this decision violated public policy because it 
de facto extended the patent term beyond the stated limit.72  The 
Patent Act, in force in 1984, granted to inventors a 17-year 
property right to their inventions.73  The Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”),74 on the other hand, required several 
statutory and regulatory steps to assure the safety and efficacy of 
generic drugs to be marketed.75  Because it could take 1–2 years 
for a generic company to satisfy these regulatory requirements for 
marketing a generic drug, Bolar argued that the arrival of generic 
drugs on the market would be unduly delayed, and the patent term 
unfairly extended, if the FDCA required tests on the patented 
product could not begin until after expiration of the patent term.76 
 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at 860–61. 
 71 Id. at 863.  “We cannot construe the experimental use rule so broadly as to allow a 
violation of the patent laws in the guise of ‘scientific inquiry,’ when that inquiry has 
definite, cognizable, and not insubstantial commercial purposes.” Id. 
 72 Id. at 864. 
 73 The law has since changed. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-
465, § 532 (a)(1) (1994).  The term of a patent used to be 17 years from the issue date of 
the patent.  Now, for applications that were pending, and patents that were still in force, 
on June 8, 1995, the patent term is either 17 years from the issue date or 20 years from 
the earliest claimed filing date, whichever is longer.  For applications filed on or after 
June 8, 1995, the patent term is 20 years from the application’s earliest claimed filing 
date. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (1996). 
 74 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–99 (1938). 
 75 Id. 
 76 Roche Products, 733 F.2d at 864 (citing THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING, 
THE COMPETITIVE STATUS OF THE U.S. PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, 79–80 (1983)). 
While the requirements of the FDCA had the effect of extending the term of a patent in 
the context of generic competition, they also had the effect of reducing the total term of 
patent protection in the context of the branded drug.  This is because, while patents 
typically are granted 3-5 years after filing, the testing required to support approval by the 
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The Federal Circuit declined to create a new exemption to 
infringement for the testing of generic drugs.  The Roche Products 
court found no support for such exemption in the Patent Act and 
refused to “engage in legislative activity proper only for the 
Congress.”77 
B. The Statutory Exemption from Patent Infringement 
Congress responded promptly to the Roche Products decision 
and to the lobbying efforts of the branded and generic 
pharmaceutical industries, by enacting a statutory compromise.78  
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 
1984 (also known as the “Hatch-Waxman Act”)79 amended the 
FDCA and the Patent Act to rectify the distortions enunciated in 
the Roche Products case by (a) establishing an abbreviated 
approval process for generic drugs; (b) restoring the patent term for 
pioneer drugs so as to recover patent term lost during the lengthy 
approval process; and (c) creating a “safe harbor” exemption—or 
the Bolar exemption as it is referred to outside the U.S.—from 
patent infringement for work that was needed to obtain drug 
approval.80  The legislative intent of the Hatch-Waxman Act was 
to strike a balance between the interests of pharmaceutical 
companies, generic manufacturers and consumers, by encouraging 
greater expenditure in the area of pharmaceutical invention through 
longer effective patent terms while simultaneously encouraging 
generic drug development and ensuring greater competition 
immediately after the expiration or invalidity of the relevant 
patents.81 
 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to market a branded drug often takes 10–12 years.  
Thus, by the time the drug product reaches the market, only 8–10 years of patent 
protection remain. See id. 
 77 Roche Products, 733 F.2d at 863–64. 
 78 This statute did not, however, disturb the Federal Circuit’s enunciation in Roche 
Products of the parameters of the common law experimental use exception. 
 79 Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984). 
 80 Id. 
 81 See H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, at 16–18 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2647, 2649–51.  See also Samuel M. Kais, A Survey of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) as 
Interpreted by the Courts: The Infringement Exemption Created by the 1984 Patent Term 
Restoration Act, 13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 575, 576 (1997) (citing 
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To address the first goal, Congress created several new 
provisions to encourage greater investment in pharmaceutical 
innovation.  Specifically, the Hatch-Waxman Act restored at least 
a part of the patent term for pioneer drugs that had undergone 
protracted pre-market testing to ensure drug safety and efficacy as 
mandated by the FDCA, after the patent had issued.82  Under these 
provisions, branded drugs have been entitled to an average 
extension of about three years in patent term.83  This extension 
allows the patent owner more time to recoup the expenses of drug 
development and to fund subsequent research on new drugs by 
marketing the drugs at “patent” prices.84 
The second goal was to ensure greater competition in the 
market, i.e., to maximize the post-patent availability of lower 
priced products, by narrowing the gap between patent expiration 
and generic entry.85  To do this, Congress established a “safe 
harbor” exemption for otherwise infringing activities if they relate 
to the development and submission of information to the Food and 
Drug Administration (“FDA”).86  Specifically, the statute recites 
that: 
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to 
sell, or sell within the United States or import into the 
United States a patented invention. . . solely for uses 
reasonably related to the development and submission of 
information under a Federal law which regulates the 
 
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 
98 Stat. 1585 (1984)). 
 82 See Kais, supra note 81, at 577. 
 83 Congressional Budget Office, How Increased Competition from Generic Drugs Has 
Affected Prices and Returns in the Pharmaceutical Industry, at 4, 28 (1998) available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=655&sequence=5 (click “PDF”). 
 84 The extension compensates the patent owner for a part of the time the patent was not 
protecting the owner from the market because the drug was not yet approved.  It does so 
by moving a part of the ineffective patent term to the effective patent term, i.e., when the 
drug is on the market.  A maximum of five years can be restored to the patent term.  The 
total patent term, with an extension, cannot exceed fourteen years from the product’s 
approval date. See 35 U.S.C. § 156 (1994). 
 85 See Kais, supra note 81. 
 86 See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984). 
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manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological 
products.87 
This provision allows competitors to engage in otherwise 
infringing activities that are reasonably related to obtaining 
regulatory approval.88  Research on a patented drug can thus be 
conducted, before expiration of the patent term and without 
incurring liability for patent infringement, in order to accelerate the 
process of getting a drug to market.89  To be sure, Congress passed 
section 271(e)(1) with the intent of facilitating the entry of generic 
drugs into the market upon expiration of the brand name patent on 
the compound with as little barrier to entry, i.e., artificial extension 
of the patent monopoly, as possible.90  Because of the Hatch-
Waxman Act generic drugs can now enter the U.S. market almost 
immediately after patent protection on the brand name drug 
expires, or is held to be invalid or unenforceable, in contrast to the 
case in many other countries.91  In many ways the Hatch-Waxman 
Act created the generic drug industry.92 
 
 87 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (Supp. 2004) (emphasis added).  The full recitation excludes 
new animal drugs and veterinary products from the patented inventions, presumably 
because the rest of the complex patent term restoration law excluded these drugs. 
 88 See Kais, supra note 81. 
 89 Other provisions were also added in the Hatch-Waxman Act to accelerate the 
approval process for generic drugs specifically.  See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 355(j).  Again, 
however, the Hatch-Waxman Act balanced the right of the generic and the drug 
companies.  For example, it made the filing of an application for approval of a generic 
drug (an “ANDA”) an act of infringement that allowed patentees to sue even though such 
filing was not a making, using or selling of the patented drug.  It also provided that the 
FDA could not approve the generic for the lesser of 30 months after the ANDA filing, 
patent expiration, or a court holding of patent invalidity (the “30 month stay”).  This gave 
the branded companies the chance to enforce the patent against the generic to prevent 
marketing before valid patent expiration and yet allowed the generic to file for approval 
to market before the patent term expired.  This protects customers from having to pay 
“patent” prices for drugs that are the subject of expired or invalid patents. 
 90 See generally Innovation and Patent Law Reform: Hearing on H.R. 3285, H.R. 3286 
and H.R. 3605 Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration 
of Justice,of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 527 (1984). 
 91 See infra Part IV. 
 92 Before Hatch-Waxman, only 35% of the top-selling drugs had generic competition 
after their patents expired; now almost all pioneer (non-biological) drugs face such 
competition.  See Henry Grabowski and John Vernon, Longer Patents for Lower 
Imitation Barriers: The 1984 Drug Act, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 195–98 (May 1986).  See 
also A. Maureen Rouhi, Beyond Hatch-Waxman, Legislative Action Seeks to Close 
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However, the language of the “safe harbor” of section 
271(e)(1) is not limited to generic drug manufacturers or to drug 
patents.93  This breadth of statutory language has been a hallmark 
of the jurisprudence construing the safe harbor.  By contrast with 
the common law exemption, U.S. courts have construed the safe 
harbor exemption rather broadly.  The Supreme Court, for 
example, has construed the term “patented invention” of 271(e)(1) 
to include all patented inventions, including medical devices and 
human biologics as well as drug products.94  Moreover, the Federal 
Circuit has effectively read the provision “solely” out of the 
language of the statute.95  Courts have also adopted a flexible 
reading of the phrase “reasonably related” so as to give parties 
some latitude in making prospective judgments about the nature 
and extent of activities they plan to engage in to win FDA 
approval.96 
In Intermedics v. Ventritex, Co., the California District Court 
reasoned that accused acts should be protected as long as it would 
have been reasonable for a party to believe there was a “decent 
prospect” that the activities in question would contribute to the 
generation of information relevant to the FDA approval process.97  
This became known as the “objective reality” test.98  More 
recently, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New 
 
Loopholes in U.S. Law that Delay Entry of Generics Into the Market, 80 CHEMICAL & 
ENG’G NEWS 53–59 (Sept. 23, 2002), available at http://pubs.acs.org/cen/coverstory/ 
8038/8038biogenerics2.html. 
 93 See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 666 (1990) (holding that a 
“Federal law” in 271(e)(1) refers to any regulation under the FDCA, not only those 
relating to drugs or veterinary biological products); Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai 
Pharmaceutical Co., 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16110, at *177–78 (D. Mass. 1989). 
 94 See id. 
 95 AbTox Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1030 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that 
271(e)(1) language does not look to the underlying purposes or consequences of the 
research activity, thus, as long as the research is reasonably related to obtaining FDA 
approval, the data can also be used for other purposes). 
 96 See, e.g., Intermedics v. Ventritex, Co., 775 F. Supp. 1269, 1280 (N.D. Cal. 1991). 
 97 Id. 
 98 Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 104, 111 (D. Mass. 
1998). See also Katherine A. Helm & James F. Haley, Jr., The Fine Line of the Law: 
Patent Infringement Exemptions in the U.S., LIFE SCIENCES LAW & BUSINESS, Dec. 
2004/Jan. 2005. 
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York ruled that the use of patented intermediates that were being 
used as research tools in drug development but would never be 
submitted to the FDA for approval themselves, was exempted from 
infringement under the safe harbor.99  In rendering its verdict, the 
Court applied the objective reality test and found that there was a 
decent prospect that the use of the patented intermediates would 
contribute to the generation of information relevant to FDA 
approval.100  Based on these broad judicial constructions, therefore, 
the safe harbor can be invoked by any organization making or 
using any patented invention for purposes that are “reasonably 
related” to the development and submission of information for 
government (i.e., FDA) approval to market.  The safe harbor thus 
eviscerates the patentees’ right to exclude in these circumstances. 
Determining the precise contours of safe harbor protection 
from patent infringement nonetheless remains the source of much 
legal debate, because, in the words of the Supreme Court, the 
hastily drafted 1984 act is simply “not plainly comprehensible on 
anyone’s view.”101  Bereft of clear statutory guidance, courts often 
look to the legislative history of the statute in an attempt to uphold 
the intent of encouraging greater expenditure and competition in 
the area of pharmaceutical innovation.102  While U.S. courts have 
consistently held that the safe harbor applies to activities that are 
reasonably related to seeking FDA approval, the issue of when the 
safe harbor begins remains a stumbling block.103  A strong 
undercurrent of legal and political conflict surrounds this question 
 
 99 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., No. 95-8833, 2001 WL 
1512597 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2001) (overruled on other grounds in 326 F.3d 1226 (Fed. 
Cir. 2003)). 
 100 Id. at *3–4. 
 101 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 667 (1990), cited in William L 
Warren, Supreme Court Broadens Therapeutic Research Exemption From Patent 
Infringement in Merck, IP Value 2006, available at http://www.buildingipvalue.com/ 
06US_Can/131_134.htm. 
 102 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.  See also, e.g., Merck KGaA v. Integra 
Lifesciences I Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372, 2383–84 (2005). 
 103 Unlike the circumscribed clinical test periods required by the FDA (i.e., Phase I tests 
for safety, Phase II tests for efficacy and Phase III tests for side effects and long-term use 
effects), the earlier research and preclinical testing phases embraced by the safe harbor 
are far less delineated. 
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because its answer will effectively determine the worth of patents 
directed to upstream drug discovery technology, such as patents for 
methods of screening, mechanism of action and targets for drug 
intervention as well as patents on research tools. 
Where the line is drawn with respect to whether or not early 
stage drug research is exempt from patent infringement is, 
therefore, sharply divided between drug developers on the one 
hand and research tool patent proprietors on the other.  If early 
stage drug research is exempt, the research tool company loses the 
value of the patent.  If early stage drug research is not exempt, the 
drug developer must either negotiate a number of licenses before 
beginning drug development and as a result burden the ultimate 
product with costs or restrictions up front or risk the spectra of 
injunctions and downstream damages for use of the patented tool.  
The controversy is ongoing. 
Recent decisions of the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court 
suggest that there may be some early stage drug research that is 
outside the safe harbor and not protected by the common law 
research exemption to patent infringement.  The Supreme Court 
directly addressed the 271(e)(1) safe harbor exemption in Merck 
KGaA v. Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd.104  This highly prominent case 
involved experiments that were conducted by the Scripps Research 
Institute and funded by Merck on compounds known as “RGD” 
peptides.105  The experiments sought to determine the peptides’ 
efficacy as inhibitors of angiogenesis (to reduce blood flow to 
tumors) and suitability as potential anti-cancer drug candidates for 
clinical trials.106  Integra brought suit against Merck for conducting 
drug screening, lead optimization, and preclinical tests (i.e. non-
human) on drug candidates using certain Integra-patented cell 
adhesion-promoting RGD peptides.107  The issue that rose to the 
Supreme Court was whether uses of patented inventions in 
 
 104 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005). 
 105 RGD peptides were those that contained the tripeptide sequence Arg-Gly-Asp. Id. at 
2377. 
 106 Id. at 2377–78. 
 107 The Integra-patented RGD peptides were used as “positive controls” against which 
Scripps measured the efficacy of the lead drug candidates. Id. at 2379. 
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preclinical research, the results of which were not directly included 
in a submission to the FDA but rather were used to identify and 
characterize the best drug candidate for future clinical testing, were 
within the safe harbor and thus exempt from infringement 
liability.108 
The District Court ruled and the Federal Circuit affirmed that 
the safe harbor was confined to activity that would “contribute 
relatively directly” to information the FDA would consider in 
approving a drug and therefore, Merck had infringed Integra’s 
patents in its preclinical activities.109  The Federal Circuit refused 
to make room under the umbrella of section 271(e)(1) for 
“exploratory research” testing that “at some point, however 
attenuated, may lead to an FDA approval process.”110  The 
Supreme Court overruled the Federal Circuit’s strict construction 
of the safe harbor and created what it called a “wide berth” for the 
use of patented drugs in activities that necessarily include 
preclinical studies for the development of a potential drug 
candidate.111  This holding is not surprising in view of the strong 
push by the United States Government as amicus curia to broadly 
interpret the upstream boundary of section 271(e)(1) to favor the 
discovery of new cancer treatments, as a matter of public policy.112  
Not insignificantly, the pharmaceutical industry also strongly 
supported Merck and Scripps, arguing that every activity during 
drug development generates valuable information that helps 
determine whether a potential new drug treatment will progress 
 
 108 Id. at 2376.  At the trial level Merck argued both the common law research 
exemption defense and the safe harbor defense.  But, the former was abandoned on 
appeal to the Federal Circuit, in part because in the recent wake of the Madey decision 
there was a perception that the common law use defense was dead. See discussion Part 
III.A. and notes 59–64 (discussing Judge Newman’s dissent).  See also, Harold C. 
Wegner, Post-Merck Experimental Use and the “Safe Harbor”, 15 FED. CIR. B.J. 1, 13–
17 (2005).  Thus, the only question that remained was what constituted the upstream 
boundary of the safe harbor exemption. 
 109 See Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 867 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 110 Id. 
 111 Merck KGaA, 125 S. Ct. at 2380. 
 112 See generally, Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 
Merck KGaA, 125 S. Ct. 2372 (No. 03-1237), 2005 WL 429972. 
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towards gaining FDA approval to market.113  This reasoning 
clearly resonated with the Supreme Court, as it stated “[w]e thus 
agree with the Government that the use of patented compounds in 
preclinical studies is protected under §271(e)(1) as long as there is 
a reasonable basis for believing that the experiments will produce 
‘the types of information that are relevant to [FDA 
submissions].’”114 
The Supreme Court tempered its broad holding only slightly by 
agreeing with the Federal Circuit that the safe harbor exemption 
does not apply to all experimental activity and does  not protect 
basic scientific research on a particular compound conducted 
without any intent to develop a particular drug.115  Thus, the 
Supreme Court insinuated that early-stage exploratory research 
may be outside the safe harbor.116  Finally, although the Supreme 
Court acknowledged the Federal Circuit’s suggestion that a limited 
construction of the safe harbor was necessary to avoid depriving 
research tool patents of value, the Court pithily declined to address 
the implications for research tool patents in its decision.117 
There has been much controversy surrounding the Merck 
decision, both from the drug industry and the research tool 
industry.  Many commentators have argued that the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the safe harbor is not one of strict 
constructionism and that this matter should be left for the 
legislature to amend and further delineate the “reasonably related” 
text of section 271(e)(1).118  In such legislative construction, large 
drug companies would undoubtedly lobby for Congress to 
definitively broaden the safe harbor due to the time and cost 
involved in innovative drug development and to positively shelter 
 
 113 See generally Brief for Eli Lilly and Co., Wyeth & Pfizer, Inc. as Amici Curiae, 
Supporting Petitioner, Merck KgaA, 125 S. Ct. 2372 (No. 03-1237), 2005 WL 435888. 
 114 Merck KGaA, 125 S. Ct. at 2383–84 (quoting Brief of the United States as Amicus 
Curiae at 23).  See also Wegner, supra note 108, at 23–27. 
 115 Merck KGaA, 125 S. Ct. at 2382. 
 116 See id. 
 117 Id. at 2382 n.7.  The Supreme Court reasoned that because RGD peptides were not 
used as research tools, “[w]e therefore need not—and do not—express a view about 
whether, or to what extent, § 271(e)(1) exempts from infringement the use of ‘research 
tools’ in the development of information for the regulatory process.” 
 118 See Wegner, supra note 108, at 27. 
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drug developers from patent infringement liability during these 
development activities.  On the other hand, research tool 
companies would lobby to restrict the safe harbor so as to provide 
value to their patents and business models.  In the absence of 
further legislation, the safe harbor provision will have to be 
revisited by the courts to determine the fate of research tool patents 
generally. 
The future ramifications of holding certain experimental 
activity outside the safe harbor on the research and development 
operations of U.S. pharmaceutical firms are manifold.  One 
potential ramification is that early stage exploratory drug research 
will be outsourced to non-U.S. jurisdictions, where it either would 
not constitute infringement under local jurisprudence or where no 
patents exist or are of limited enforceability.  Uncertainty creates 
risk and the currently indeterminate state of section 271(e)(1)’s 
upstream boundary will motivate U.S.-based pharmaceutical 
companies to engage in risk management and move their value-
added activities offshore.119 
For large multinational pharmaceutical firms, the outsourcing 
of early stage drug research can be accomplished by transferring a 
particular research activity from a U.S. enterprise to an associated 
non-U.S. enterprise (e.g., a foreign subsidiary).  U.S.-based 
pharmaceutical firms must carefully select an offshore location for 
research to optimize the legal and economic circumstances 
surrounding the transaction.120  U.S.-based pharmaceutical firms 
who decide to outsource the early drug research to an optimal 
location must also consider the next transaction in the global 
supply chain: What happens when they bring information obtained 
 
 119 While lawyers may view the currently amorphous limit of the safe harbor as an 
invitation to test the boundaries, companies would rather alter their research operations to 
ensure that their practice falls under a clear set of defined rules. See Wegner, supra note 
108. 
 120 There are significant tax implications involved when transferring these sorts of 
intangible corporate assets between affiliated companies in different countries.  See, e.g., 
Martin Sullivan, With Billions at Stake, Glaxo puts U.S. APA Program on Trial, 34 TAX 
NOTES INT’L 456 (2004) (discussing the largest transfer pricing case in history involving 
GlaxoSmithKline’s allocation of income between its U.K. patents and its U.S. marketing 
intangibles). 
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and/or lead drug compounds identified in research conducted 
offshore back into the United States?  This next section examines 
the legal implications of importing the results or products of early 
stage drug research that has been conducted offshore into the U.S. 
C. Exemptions from Patent Infringement Through Importation 
The Patent Laws of the United States address the importation 
of products produced in non-U.S. jurisdictions by processes 
patented in the United States.  Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(g), the 
importation of a product into the U.S. that was made abroad by a 
process patented in the United States is infringement.121  This 
section thus offers a remedy to patent holders in cases where the 
importation of products manufactured abroad would be infringing 
if produced within the United States.  Indeed, Congress enacted 
section 271(g) to provide “meaningful protection” to process 
patent holders and to eliminate the potential for circumvention of 
U.S. patent law through conduct abroad.122  This protection is 
particularly important for research-based pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology companies that invest substantial capital in the 
process of developing and producing a drug product that may 
ultimately be protectable by a process patent alone.123  The body of 
 
 121 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (1988).  The statute lists two exceptions to infringement under 
this section: when the product is materially changed by subsequent processes or when the 
product becomes a trivial and nonessential component of another product. 
 122 While U.S. law “cannot prevent a party from performing a patented process abroad, 
it can and does prevent a party from bringing the resulting products into this country.  In 
doing so, the law attempts to provide full substantive protection of patentees’ exclusive 
rights in the United States.” See Kristin E. Gerdelman, Comment, Subsequent 
Performance of Process Steps by Different Entities: Time to Close Another Loophole in 
U.S. Patent Law, 53 EMORY L.J. 1987, 2003 (2004). 
 123 Process patents can be obtained for new processes of making old products.  Because 
many biotechnological products are inherently found in nature, biotechnological 
innovation frequently takes the form of finding more efficient ways to make a pre-
existing “product.”  A process patent is often the only patent protection a biotechnology 
company has for a product.  Thus, the biotechnology industry was one of the strongest 
advocates for the enactment of section 271(g). See Process Patent Legislation: Hearing 
on S. 568, S. 573, and S. 635 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and 
Trademarks of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 27–28 (1987) (statement of 
Richard D. Godown, President, Industrial Biotechnology Association) (“The very 
availability of these products (and associated jobs) is threatened when a company cannot 
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case law construing these provisions, therefore, needs to be 
considered insofar as it would impact the outsourcing of early 
stage drug research by pharmaceutical companies. 
The first consideration involves the exemption to liability for 
infringement, under section 271(g)(1), when the product is 
“materially changed” by subsequent processes from the end 
product produced by the patented process.  Initial cases generally 
construed the term in a straightforward manner to uphold the 
legislative intent of the statute and to attach liability when a 
process being performed abroad was deemed to constitute an 
“essential part of the overall process” for producing a product 
intended for the U.S. market.124 
However, an increasingly sophisticated drug industry soon 
begat increasingly complex issues for the courts.  In Eli Lilly & Co. 
v. American Cyanamid Co.,125 Eli Lilly sued generic drug 
manufacturer American Cyanamid for importing an antibiotic drug 
(cefaclor) that was made by a process that included Lilly’s 
patented process for making an intermediate chemical (compound 
6).126  Lilly argued that because the only commercial use for the 
intermediate compound in the U.S. was to produce the drug 
cefaclor, the intermediate was essentially the same as the drug and 
thus could not meet the “materially changed” requirement for 
exemption from infringement.127  The district court disagreed and 
held that cefaclor’s unique structural and biological properties 
 
be assured that its multi-million dollar research program will not be vulnerable to unfair 
practices.”). 
 124 See, e.g., Bio-Technology Gen. Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 80 F.3d 1553, 1561 (Fed. 
Cir. 1996) (holding that a process for making a plasmid as a replicable cloning vehicle 
encompasses using it to express its intended protein product—human growth hormone—
which was imported into the U.S. for marketing and sale). 
 125 82 F.3d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 126 Cefaclor is a complex molecule derived from forms of penicillin.  American 
Cyanamid’s Italian manufacturer produced bulk cefaclor in a nine-step process with a 
starting material (compound 1), eight chemically distinct intermediates (compounds 2–9), 
and a final end product (cefaclor).  Eli Lilly had obtained patents on several of the 
intermediates as well as the end product.  Since most of these patents had expired, Lilly 
was only able to rely on the patent on the process of making compound 6 (that covered 
the process of converting compound 5 to compound 6) in this suit. Eli Lilly & Co. v. 
American Cyanamid Co., 896 F. Supp. 851, 853–54 (S.D. Ind. 1995). 
 127 Id. at 856–58. 
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constituted a material change from intermediate compound 6 as 
produced by the patented process.128  On appeal, the Federal 
Circuit affirmed and held that the structural differences between 
the intermediate and the end compound rose to the level of a 
material change.129  In its decision, the court acknowledged the 
overseas use of patented processes in research was a global 
concern, but stated it could not stretch the term “materially 
changed” to broaden the statute’s effectiveness in addressing the 
problem.130  This ruling broke ground for pharmaceutical 
companies to outsource intermediate products and research tools in 
early stage drug research. 
The second decision that further opened the way for 
outsourcing involved a construction of the non-manufacturing 
exemption to liability for infringement under section 271(g).131  In 
Bayer AG v. Housey Pharms. Inc.,132 the process patents in 
question were directed to methods of screening protein inhibitors 
and activators for compounds that indicated a potential for 
development as pharmaceuticals.133  The issue that arose was 
whether Bayer was liable for importing data into the United States 
that was obtained from practicing these research tool process 
patents.134  The court held that section 271(g) does not entitle the 
patent holder to exclude the importation into the United States of 
information obtained by carrying out the patented method 
overseas.135  Under Housey,  section 271(g)’s purview was limited 
to physically manufactured goods brought into the United 
States.136  This ruling suggests information from early stage drug 
research done abroad (and likely, lead drug compounds identified 
 
 128 Id. 
 129 Eli Lilly, 82 F.3d 1568. 
 130 Id. at 1572. 
 131 Bayer AG v. Housey Pharms., Inc., 169 F. Supp. 2d 328 (D. Del. 2001), overruled 
on other grounds by 340 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. at 329. 
 134 Housey alleged that Bayer should be held liable upon importation of “any knowledge 
and information” that reflected the identification or characterization of a drug acquired 
from using Housey’s patented methods. Id. 
 135 Id. at 330. 
 136 See id. 
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in the research) may be imported into the U.S. without infringing 
process patents under section 271(g). 
Finally, those who outsource need to consider whether the drug 
products or processes they develop will infringe early stage drug 
research patents.  For example, the patents at issue in Merck KGaA 
v. Integra Lifesciences I Ltd.137 claimed the RGD peptides 
themselves.138  Therefore, while the use of those peptides in early 
stage drug research outside of the U.S. (under Eli Lilly) and the 
importation of information learned in the research brought into the 
U.S. (under Housey) might not be infringing activities, the ultimate 
sale of the peptides would potentially infringe. 139  By contrast, as 
discussed previously in this paper, “reach through” claims to 
products developed by patented research tools are likely not 
valid.140  Hence, those products could likely be sold in the U.S. 
without infringing the research tool patents.141  This untested 
analysis is further complicated by a perplexing recent jury decision 
which held the sales of two drug products infringed a patent 
claiming the mechanism of action of those products.142 
 
 137 545 U.S. 193, 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005). 
 138 Id. at 2377. 
 139 See 82 F.3d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1996); 169 F. Supp. 2d 328 (D. Del. 2001). 
 140 See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 141 See, e.g., Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(holding a patent directed to methods of selectively inhibiting certain enzyme activity did 
not sufficiently describe a compound [Celebrex®] that functioned by that mechanism).  
For further discussion, see Rakesh Mehta, University of Rochester Corp. v. G.D. Searle 
& Co., Inc.: How to Lose Millions in Patent Royalties, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 547 (2005). 
 142 Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., Civil Action No. 02-11280-RWZ, (D. 
Mass. May 4, 2006), LexisNexis Jury Verdicts and Settlement Report.  In this unusual 
verdict, a federal jury held a patent owned by Harvard University, the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, and the Whitehead Institute, and licensed to Ariad 
Pharmaceuticals, was valid and infringed by the sale of Eli Lilly’s osteoporosis drug 
Evista® and septic shock drug Xigris®.  The patent claims methods for treating human 
disease by regulating cell-signaling through the NF-kappa B molecular pathway.  The 
jury awarded Ariad approximately $65 million in back royalties as well as a 2.3% royalty 
rate on U.S. sales of the drugs until expiration of the patent in 2019.  Eli Lilly has said 
that it will ask the trial judge to overturn the jury verdict and, if necessary, appeal the 
jury’s verdict.  After an August evidentiary hearing, the trial court is now considering 
Lilly’s allegations that the Ariad patent is not enforceable.  Also in August, following two 
ex parte requests for reexamination of the Ariad patent, the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office rejected 160 of the 203 claims as being not patentable. See Reexam. 
C.N. 90/007,503.  Finally, in a separate proceeding, Amgen Inc. recently sued Ariad for a 
HELM_FORMATTED_AUTHEDITS_102706 10/30/2006  11:39:20 AM 
186 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. Vol. 17:153 
 
Many have argued that Congress must intervene to clean up 
this clutter of jurisprudence and refine the Patent Laws, to ensure 
that infringers cannot subvert the Patent Laws to violate the rights 
of U.S. patentees.  Some attempts have already been made to close 
the gaps in the law that have facilitated the use of outsourcing.  
Representative Jim Gerlach, for example, has proposed a new bill 
to amend section 271(g) to broaden the reach of the process patent 
infringement statute and define the term “product” to include both 
physical goods and information in any fixed format.143  This would 
overcome the potential loophole created by the Housey decision.144  
It would also level the playing field between the U.S. and other 
countries in the context of where research for ultimate use in the 
U.S. can be performed.  However, it could push U.S. companies to 
outsource even more of their drug development efforts.  Under 
such a law, companies would probably carry out all of the drug 
research up to the final compound outside the United States. 
Pharmaceutical companies, who choose to outsource their early 
stage drug research efforts and bring back elements of that research 
to the U.S., will undoubtedly devise a model for their business 
operations that minimizes their potential liability under the U.S. 
Patent Laws.145  However, as mentioned earlier, multinational 
companies must be mindful of the entire legal and economic 
circumstances surrounding any transaction that outsource part of 
their businesses, in an effort to maximize their global profitability 
and minimize their liability at home and abroad.146  The next 
section addresses the step in the business supply chain that entails 
selecting offshore locations for early stage drug research. 
 
declaratory judgment that two of Amgen’s drugs Enbrel® and Kineret®, both treatments 
for rheumatoid arthritis, do not infringe the Ariad patent and that the patent is invalid. See 
Amgen Inc. et al. v. Ariad Pharms., Inc., No. 06-259 (D. Del. Apr. 10, 2006).  The cases 
and reexaminations are unlikely to be resolved for several years. 
 143 See Informatics Act of 2005, H.R. 4208, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 144 See 169 F. Supp. 2d 328 (D. Del. 2001). 
 145 This model will operationalize the potential legal liability as best it can. See supra 
note 119 and accompanying text. 
 146 See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
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IV. PATENT INFRINGEMENT OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES 
The principles underlying patent systems outside the United 
States are much the same as those in the United States.  Both 
systems serve to encourage innovation and to promote the progress 
of science and technology.  The principles of patent infringement 
are also much the same in that activities including the making, 
using, selling, offering for sale and importing of patented products 
or processes are generally held to be infringing.  Likewise, the 
remedies for such infringement are also fairly standard and include 
injunctions for the future and damages (typically royalties) for the 
past, to make the patent holder whole.147  International IP 
agreements between the United States and most other 
industrialized nations serve to promote global judicial comity and 
harmonize many basic tenets of patent infringement rulings and 
remedies.148 
Attempts at global patent harmonization falter, however, in two 
main situations.  The first is in countries where either the patent 
laws themselves are weak or the enforcement of those laws is 
virtually non-existent.  South American countries, such as Brazil 
and Argentina, and Pacific Rim countries, such as Korea, Taiwan 
and China, fit this category.149  As a consequence, many 
companies do not even file patent applications in these countries 
and, when they do file, companies have very low expectations that 
they could enforce the patent to prevent infringing activities.150  
Therefore, these countries are viable places for U.S. 
 
 147 But see eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006); see also supra 
note 19 and accompanying text. 
 148 See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Final Act Embodying the Results 
of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL 
INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) 
[hereinafter GATT]; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 
81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs]; North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 
I.L.M. 289 (pts. 1–3); 32 I.L.M. 605 (pts. 4–8) (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) 
[hereinafter NAFTA]. 
 149 See generally John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 
17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 685 (2002). 
 150 See generally id. 
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pharmaceutical companies to outsource early stage drug research.  
Indeed, some U.S. companies have turned to research 
organizations in Taiwan to conduct early stage drug research.151 
The second situation where harmonization between the United 
States jurisprudence, as applied to early stage drug discovery, and 
that of the rest of the world falters is in considering countries 
where patent laws are strong, enforcement is good and predictable 
but the laws or jurisprudence exempt certain research activities 
from patent infringement.  Typically, this occurs in industrialized 
countries that have experienced the emergence of a global and 
knowledge-based economy and therefore place supreme 
importance upon technological advancements in society.  In these 
countries, the use of patented subject matter to improve or advance 
scientific progress is paramount to protecting the rights of the 
innovator to exclude all uses of the patented inventions.  Several of 
these countries, such as the United Kingdom, Germany and Japan, 
expressly recognize an experimental use exemption in their 
statutory law.152  Those same countries have also generally read 
the statutory experimental use doctrine broadly in their 
jurisprudence.153 
This section will examine the laws of three such countries or 
regions—Canada, the European Community and India.  These are 
by and large the three most active jurisdictions for outsourced U.S. 
pharmaceutical research.  It is known that these jurisdictions that 
are apt to be more liberal than the U.S. in permitting early stage 
research even in the face of patents.  It is these jurisdictions that 
are thus the most fertile destinations for continued and future U.S. 
outsourcing of early stage drug research. 
 
 151 See Synaptic Pharm. Corp. v. MDS Panlabs, Inc., 265 F. Supp. 2d 452 (D.N.J. 2002) 
(holding that the importation of reports containing the results of patented assays 
conducted in a laboratory in Taiwan did not constitute patent infringement because the 
diagnostic information provided to U.S. customers did not constitute a product made by a 
process under section 271(g)). 
 152 Duffy, supra note 149, at 718 n.111. 
 153 Id. at 718. 
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A. Canada 
The Canadian Patent Act includes a statutory exemption from 
infringement that is similar in some ways and very different in 
others to that of the U.S. section 271(e)(1) safe harbor 
exemption.154  The Canadian provision, like section 271(e)(1), 
excludes from infringement activities that are for uses reasonably 
related to the development and submission of information for drug 
approval.155  However, the provision is much more expansive than 
section 271(e)(1) in that it provides that the submission of 
information can be under any law of any country.156  The U.S. 
provision is limited to submissions under U.S. federal laws which 
regulate the manufacture of drugs or veterinary biological 
products.157 
This distinction is important.  In the United States, only 
activities reasonably related to the submission of information to the 
FDA or other federal agency are within the safe harbor.  Therefore, 
activities solely directed to approval outside the U.S. and not part 
of the U.S. application to obtain approval to market are infringing.  
By contrast, in Canada, the activities can be directed at approval in 
any country, whether or not they are also used to support approval 
in Canada.  The Supreme Court of Canada has confirmed that the 
purpose of the regulatory exemption is to allow generic 
manufacturers to work with the patented invention, and generate 
data to the extent necessary, to facilitate lawful market entry in any 
country.158  The Canadian exemption, thus, can be used to conduct 
research and generate data in Canada that will later be used solely 
and exclusively for submission to a foreign regulatory agency, 
such as the FDA. 
 
 154 The Canadian exemption, intended to meet NAFTA requirements, was derived from 
the U.S. provision and adopted shortly before the Hatch-Waxman Act was passed in the 
United States.  It is often referred to as the “early working” exemption. 
 155 Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, § 55.2(1) (1985) (enacted 1993, ch. 2, § 4; amended 
2001, ch. 10, § 2). 
 156 Id.  The language broadly states “any law of Canada, a province or a country other 
than Canada that regulates the manufacture, construction, use or sale of any product.” Id. 
 157 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2001). 
 158 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Canada (Attorney Gen.), [2005] S.C.C. 26. 
HELM_FORMATTED_AUTHEDITS_102706 10/30/2006  11:39:20 AM 
190 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. Vol. 17:153 
 
Similar to the U.S. safe harbor exemption, however, there are 
some restrictions on the type of data that is “reasonably related” to 
the development and submission of information under Canadian 
law.  In Pfizer Canada Inc. v. Apotex Inc.,159 a federal trial court 
held that activities relating to obtaining a provincial formulary 
listing for a medicine were not exempt from infringement under 
the “early working” exemption of section 55.2(1).160  In rendering 
its verdict, the court rejected the notion that an application for a 
listing on the provincial formulary was reasonably related to the 
development and submission of information under law.  Rather, 
the court reasoned that the purpose of the formulary listing is to 
preferentially enhance access to a market and not to regulate the 
“use or sale of any drug product” as required by the exemption.161  
This judicial construction of the reasonableness of the activity 
related to regulatory approval is comparable to the objective reality 
standard employed in the United States.162 
While the limits of the statutory exemption have not been 
extensively tested in Canadian courts, a few recent cases have 
continued to expand the broad judicial reading of the exemption.  
For example, in Abbott Laboratories v. Canada (Minister of 
Health),163 the court held that the use of a substance that was being 
produced at an intermediate stage of a process in drug development 
but would not be submitted for regulatory approval itself was 
exempted from infringement under section 55.2(1).164  Likewise, 
material that was routinely taken as samples during testing and 
which incorporated but did not constitute the patented drug product 
itself was deemed to be non-infringing use under the early working 
exemption.165  The court held that section 55.2(1) is sufficiently 
broad so as to encompass intermediate lots of incoming raw 
 
 159 [2002] 20 C.P.R. 454. 
 160 Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4 (1985).  In Canada, strict price controls are maintained in 
part by direct provincial funding of drug costs.  A provincial formulary lists 
pharmaceutical products for which reimbursement is provided for residents on a 
provincial drug plan. 
 161 Pfizer Canada, [2002] 20 C.P.R. 454. 
 162 See supra notes 98–100 and accompanying text. 
 163 [2006] F.C. 120 (Can.) 
 164 Id. 
 165 Merck & Co. v. Apotex Inc., [2006] F.C. 524. 
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material “directed in one way or another” to the purpose of 
obtaining permission to sell the end product in Canada and the 
U.S., “even if such material is never sold and is ultimately 
destroyed”.166  Based on these broad judicial constructions, 
therefore, Canada’s early working exemption could likely be 
invoked by U.S.-based pharmaceutical firms for just that: early 
working-stage drug research on patented inventions for purposes 
that are “reasonably related” to the development and submission of 
information for FDA approval. 
In further support of early stage drug research, the Canadian 
Patent Act has an additional provision following the early stage 
exemption that says “for greater certainty,” the exemption does not 
affect any exception to infringement that exists at law in respect of 
acts done: (i) privately and on a non-commercial scale; (ii) for a 
non-commercial purpose; or (iii) in respect of any use, 
manufacture, construction or sale of the patented invention solely 
for the purpose of experiments that relate to the subject matter of 
the patent.167  This provision served to codify the pre-existing 
common law research exception for experimental use in Canada.168  
No case law exists on the distinctions and applications of this 
section, perhaps because the Canadian common law research 
exemption is itself so incredibly broad. 
In Canada, the common law research exemption consists 
essentially of a wholesale “fair dealing” exemption from 
infringement.169  This doctrine allows the widespread use of 
 
 166 Id. at ¶¶ 156–58. 
 167 Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, § 55.2(6) (1985).  
 168 Sheldon Burshtein, Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement in Canada, 
BLAKE’S BULLETIN ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. REPORT, Oct. 2005, at 4, available at 
http://www.blakes.com/english/publications/IP/IP-October2005.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 
2006). 
 169 Micro Chem. v. Smith Kline & French Inter-Am., [1972] S.C.R. 506.  This seminal 
case involved experiments to enable commercial production of a product for future 
compulsory licensing and laid the groundwork for a near limitless experimental use 
exemption.  The Supreme Court stated: “Patent rights were never granted to prevent 
persons of ingenuity exercising their talents in a fair way. . . . if there be neither using nor 
vending of the invention for profit, the mere making for the purpose of experiment, and 
not for a fraudulent purpose, ought not to be considered within the meaning of the 
prohibition.” Id. at 519–20. 
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patented inventions for bona fide experimentation, which includes 
all of Judge Newman’s philosophies and more: experimenting to 
establish that the invention works, to improve upon the invention, 
to better understand the invention, to find a new use for the 
invention, etc.170  More recently, it has been held that any use of an 
invention that does not proceed beyond the “experimental and 
testing phase” is non-infringing.171  Therefore, in Canada, neither 
the use of patented inventions to obtain information to be used for 
a regulatory approval process, nor the use of patented inventions 
for the purpose of experimental or testing activity is an infringing 
use.172  Canada, thus, appears to be a fertile and hospitable country 
in which to outsource early stage basic drug research that is 
potentially infringing in the United States. 
B. European Community 
The 1975 Community Patent Convention (“CPC”) signified an 
effort by the member states of the then European Economic 
Community to bring their laws relating to patents into 
conformity.173  Article 31 of the CPC provides for a statutory 
exemption from patent infringement that encompasses both the 
U.S. common law and safe harbor exemptions in one.174  It states 
that rights conferred by a patent shall not extend to “(a) acts done 
privately and for noncommercial purposes; or (b) acts done for 
experimental purposes relating to the subject matter of the patented 
invention.”175  Although the CPC is not currently in force, it 
nonetheless carries weight. Various individual member states of 
 
 170 European Econ. Cmty.: Plenipotentiary Conference on the Cmty. Patent art. 31, 
Dec. 15, 1975, 15 I.L.M. 5 (now Article 27(b) of the revised CPC 1989) [hereinafter 
CPC]. 
 171 Dableh v. Ontario Hydro, [1996] 68 C.P.R. 129. 
 172 See Burshtein, supra note 168.  See also Judith Robinson, Presentation on Canadian 
Patent Law at the Biotechnology Industry Organization 2006 Annual International 
Convention (Apr. 12, 2006). 
 173 CPC, supra note 170. 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. 
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the European Community have implemented several of its 
provisions in their national laws.176 
While different member states have construed the above 
exemption in different ways, most courts addressing the issue have 
acknowledged that the experimental purposes of subsection (b) 
need not be totally divorced from any commercial purpose.177  The 
degree to which the courts have exempted acts having a 
commercial purpose, however, has widely diverged across member 
states.  Notably, the two most influential European jurisdictions, 
the U.K. and Germany, stand the farthest apart in their 
interpretations of the scope of their respective experimental use 
exceptions. 
In the U.K., the leading case regarding the experimental use 
exception is Monsanto Co. v. Stauffer Chemical Co. & Another.178  
In this case, Stauffer sought to vary an injunction to allow it to 
practice under Monsanto’s patent for the purposes of carrying out 
field trials with an infringing herbicide and relied on subsection 
60(5)(b) of the 1977 U.K. Patents Act to do so.179  The Court 
struck a compromise in the context of Stauffer’s activities.  It ruled 
that experimentation conducted on Stauffer’s premises was 
protected by subsection 60(5)(b), even if it had a commercial 
purpose, as long as it was carried out to discover something 
unknown, i.e., to test a hypothesis, or to find out whether 
something will work in specific or different conditions.180  
However, Stauffer’s activities conducted elsewhere, “in order to 
amass information to satisfy a third party” were not covered by the 
 
 176 For example, both the U.K. exemption, contained in section 60(5)(b) of the Patents 
Act 1977 and the German “experimentation privilege,” contained in Section 11 No. 2 of 
the German Patents Act 1981, were taken nearly word-for-word from the CPC. 
 177 See infra notes 179–183 and accompanying text. 
 178 [1985] R.P.C. 515 (C.A. (Civ. Div.)). 
 179 Section 60 of the U.K. Patents Act provides a statutory definition of direct and 
indirect patent infringement in subsections 1 and 2, respectively.  Subsection 5 exempts 
activities, as recited in the CPC, that are “done privately and for purposes which are not 
commercial” or “done for experimental purposes relating to the subject matter of the 
invention” from such infringement.  Id. at 535–36. 
 180 Id. at 542. 
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experimental use exception.181  In so holding, the court expressly 
held Stauffer’s experiments with the patented herbicide for the 
purpose of obtaining marketing approval for a competing identical 
product to be infringing.  The U.K. is, thus, one of the few 
countries that has taken a narrower approach than the U.S. with 
regard to its research exemption in the regulatory approval area.   
In Germany, by contrast, the two leading cases that have 
shepherded in a broad experimental use exception are, aptly 
named, Klinische Versuche (“Clinical Trials”) I and Klinische 
Versuche (“Clinical Trials”) II.182  In Clinical Trials I, the 
defendants were engaged in clinical trials to find new uses for a 
patented drug containing the active substance interferon-gamma.183  
The Federal Supreme Court held that the clinical trials were 
protected by the “experimental purposes relating to the subject 
matter of the patented invention” language of the German 
experimentation privilege.184  In so holding, the Court reasoned 
that the statutory provision makes no qualitative or quantitative 
limit on the experimental acts.185  It thus cannot matter whether the 
experiments are used only to scientifically verify the statements 
made in the patent or to obtain further research results, and 
whether they are employed for wider purposes, such as commercial 
interests.186   
Clinical Trials II buttressed the above holding.  It exempted 
from infringement clinical experiments with a patented 
erythropoietin (“EPO”) that sought to specifically distinguish that 
EPO from the one then on the market and to obtain approval to 
market the modified EPO.187  This holding solidified the broad 
 
 181 Id.  The location of the activities was likely not important. Rather, the intent of the 
activities—to find out new information or to merely convince a third party to allow 
marketing—was the important factor. 
 182 Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Supreme Court] May 18, 1995, Klinische 
Versuche (Clinical Trials) I, [1997] R.P.C. 623 (F.R.G.) [hereinafter Clinical Trials I]; 
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Supreme Court] Apr. 17, 1998, Klinische Versuche 
(Clinical Trials) II, [1998] R.P.C. 423 (F.R.G.) [hereinafter Clinical Trials II]. 
 183 Clinical Trials I, [1997] R.P.C. 623. 
 184 Patentgesetz [Patents Act], Dec. 16, 1980, BGBl. 1981 I 2, § 11 no. 2 (F.R.G.). 
 185 Clinical Trials I, [1997] R.P.C. 623. 
 186 Id. at 639. 
 187 Clinical Trials II, [1998] R.P.C. at 423–24. 
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applicability of Germany’s experimental use exemption.  It allows 
third parties to test patented inventions for the express purpose of 
obtaining approval to market their own products if one purpose of 
the tests is to learn something new.  The Clinical Trials II decision 
resonates with the U.S. holdings that read “solely” out of the safe 
harbor statute.188 The German Court did not concern itself with 
whatever additional motivations might exist or whatever purposes 
the obtained results would ultimately serve beyond the actual 
experimental purpose of the acts.189  Ultimately, in Germany, as 
long as the experiments are directly aimed at obtaining new 
information, the research is likely to be exempt without regard to 
its industrial purpose.190 
As suggested in the above-noted cases, both U.K. and German 
courts are likely to exempt from infringement tests to discover new 
information.  Beyond that, the courts will look to the underlying 
purpose of the experiments.  In the U.K., preclinical experiments 
conducted to obtain regulatory approval to market will not be 
permitted.191  In Germany, however, these experiments are broadly 
exempt from infringement and data obtained therein may plainly 
be used to obtain marketing approval and advance science alike.192  
In terms of early stage drug research, European countries that veer 
with Germany on the broad exemption side will be preferential 
locations for outsourcing.  At present, these countries include 
Belgium, France, and Italy.193 In the future, this group may 
expand. 
The European Union’s Parliament and Council has adopted a 
Directive on the Community Code relating to medicinal products 
for human use, which specifically provides for an exemption from 
patent infringement to “improve the operation of the marketing 
authorization procedures” and conduct the necessary studies and 
 
 188 See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
 189 Clinical Trials II, [1998] R.P.C. at 431. 
 190 See Clinical Trials I, [1997] R.P.C. at 645. 
 191 See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Stauffer Chemical Co., [1985] R.P.C. 515 (C.A. (Civ. 
Div.)). 
 192 See, e.g., Clinical Trials I, [1997] R.P.C. 623. 
 193 Michael Gilbert, Presentation on European Patent Law at the Biotechnology Industry 
Organization 2006 Annual International Convention (Apr. 12, 2006). 
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trials needed to obtain marketing authorization—the so-called 
“EU-Bolar” provision.194  Although the impact of this Directive on 
the patent laws of member states is not yet clear, it is likely to 
render the European Community an even more attractive offshore 
partner for early stage preclinical and clinical pharmaceutical 
research. 
C. India 
Like many developing countries, India maintains fairly weak 
patent laws in order to provide relatively inexpensive products to 
its citizens and provide a favorable infrastructure for local facilities 
of multinational corporations.195  In an international arbitrage game 
of sorts, India is offering competitive contract research services 
and technology transfer programs for industrialized countries, in 
the hope that the Indian economy will profit in return.196  Indeed, 
many multinational companies have found it highly profitable to 
outsource various portions of their research operations to India197 
and, in turn, India’s economy has posted an average growth rate of 
more than 7% in the decade since 1994.198 
 
 194 Council Directive 2004/27, 2004 O.J. (L 136) 34 (EC). 
 195 See Suresh Koshy, The Effect of TRIPs on Indian Patent Law: A Pharmaceutical 
Industry Perspective, 1 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 4, 4 (1995). 
 196 See generally id. 
 197 See, e.g., DOMINIC WILSON & ROOPA PURUSHOTHAMAN, GOLDMAN SACHS GLOBAL 
ECONOMICS PAPER NO. 99, DREAMING WITH BRICS: THE PATH TO 2050 (Oct. 2003), 
available at http://www.gs.com/insight/research/reports/99.pdf. 
 198 The India Nuclear Deal: Implications for Global Climate Change: Testimony before 
the U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, 109th Cong. (July 18, 
2006) (statement of David G. Victor, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Science and Technology, 
Council on Foreign Relations), available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/11123/ 
india_nuclear_deal.html.  Currently, it is estimated that anywhere from one-half to two-
thirds of all Fortune 500 companies are outsourcing to India. Stephanie Overby, Inside 
Outsourcing in India, CIO MAGAZINE, June 1, 2003, available at http://www.cio.com/ 
archive/060103/outsourcing.html.  The most popular services for outsourcing include 
rendering software programming services and performing clinical trials for 
pharmaceutical companies. See Watch Out India! China Wants to Be Outsourcing 
Powerhouse Too, YAHOO! NEWS, http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20060908/tc_afp/china 
economybusinessitoutsourcing_060908110643 (last visited Sept. 13, 2006); Arun Bhatt, 
Clinical Trials in India: Pangs of Globalization, 36 INDIAN J. PHARMACOLOGY 207, 207 
(2004), available at http://www.ijp-online.com/article.asp?issn=0253-7613;year=2004; 
volume=36;issue=4;spage=207;epage=208;aulast=Bhatt. 
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The Patents Act of 1970 governs current Indian patent law.199  
The Indian Patents Act not surprisingly includes a statutory 
exemption from infringement that is much broader than that of the 
U.S. section 271(e)(1) safe harbor exemption.  The Indian 
provision is similar to the U.S. safe harbor in that it excludes from 
infringement, activities for uses reasonably related to the 
development and submission of information for drug approval.200  
The Indian provision is much broader than the U.S. safe harbor and 
similar to the Canadian early working exemption in that it provides 
that the submission of information can be under any law of any 
country.201  Moreover, unlike the U.S. safe harbor exemption and 
the Canadian early working exemption, there are no judicial 
restrictions on the type of data that is “reasonably related” to the 
development and submission of information under Indian law. 202 
In further support of early stage drug research, the Indian 
Patents Act also includes an experimental use exemption.  The 
exemption provides that any patented machine or apparatus or 
patented process or any article made by the use of a patented 
process “may be used, by any person, for the purpose merely of 
experiment or research including the imparting of instructions to 
pupils.”203  There is no jurisprudence construing this provision.  
However, Indian courts would likely consider the following three 
elements in construing the breadth of this statute: (a) the so-called 
Golden Rule: the literal meaning of the statute; (b) the statement of 
objects and reasons of the statute (i.e. the legislative history); and 
(c) the jurisprudence in other jurisdictions.204  Considering these 
factors, an Indian court would be likely to construe the above 
exemption broadly and without a limit to working on the subject 
matter of the invention. 
 
 199 The Patents Act, No. 39 of 1970; India A.I.R. Manual (1979), vol. 27 [hereinafter 
The Indian Patents Act]. 
 200 Id. at § 107(A). 
 201 The language broadly states “any law . . . in India, or in a country other than India, 
that regulates the manufacture, construction, use or sale of any product.” Id. 
 202 Himanshu Kane, Presentation on Indian Patent Law at the Biotechnology Industry 
Organization 2006 Annual International Convention (Apr. 12, 2006). 
 203 The Indian Patents Act, supra note 199, § 47(3). 
 204 Kane, supra note 202. 
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There is also no distinction in the Indian Patents Act between 
the use of patented inventions in the course of research as 
distinguished from the use of patented inventions for a commercial 
purpose.  Therefore, under Indian patent law, no infringement 
liability attaches for the use of a patented invention in research for 
commercial purposes.  Fundamentally, Indian courts tend to 
encourage and maintain a continuous flow of research and 
innovation to support their rapidly growing economy.  Indian 
courts “lean against monopolies.”205  They seek to accelerate the 
pace of research, discovery and growth in their services sector.206  
Overall, the legal and business climate of India makes it another 
appealing country in which to perform early stage basic drug 
research that may be patent infringing activities in the United 
States.  The recent and rapid development of “Genome Valley” in 
Hyderabad is direct evidence of this phenomenon.207 
V. A NEED FOR INCREASED HARMONIZATION 
“The patent system has become sand rather than lubricant in 
the wheels of American technological progress.”208  This statement 
expresses the frustration of those who believe that U.S. power and 
leverage are declining in view of an unresolved tension between 
the legislative intent and the judicial application of the Patent 
Laws.209  Indeed, recent U.S. decisions on patent infringement in 
drug research have created a quandary that may end up forcing 
 
 205 Niky Tasha India Pvt. Ltd. v. Gadgets Pvt. Ltd., A.I.R. 1985 Delhi 141. 
 206 See, e.g., WILSON & PURUSHOTHAMAN, supra note 197.  The growth rate of India’s 
service exports in 2002 was 8% in comparison to 5% worldwide and its services sector 
accounts for more than half of the country’s overall Gross Domestic Product.  Much of 
the rise in the service sectors is attributable to the growth of India’s information 
technology and industrial research markets. See Economy for the Month, Indian 
Economy, ECONOMYWATCH.COM, http://www.economywatch.com/economyoverview/oct 
2005-economy.html#s (last visited Sept. 13, 2006). 
 207 Genome Valley consists of a large biotechnology hub that advertises itself as a state-
of-the-art center providing all stages of research, training, collaboration and 
manufacturing activities for biotechnology companies worldwide. See Genome Valley, 
http://www.genomevalley.org (last visited Sept. 26, 2006). 
 208 Adam B. Jaffee, A Patent System on Trial: Innovation and Its Discontents, 70 PAT., 
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 709, 709 (2005). 
 209 See id. 
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U.S. companies to outsource a majority of their early stage 
research.  At present, some pharmaceutical companies are 
addressing these challenges with “product sourcing solutions,” 
which euphemistically refer to going offshore.  Other smaller 
research-based companies and academic institutions are simply 
using patented technology without a license and informally 
invoking a de facto broad research exemption.210 
This self-help response of the drug and research industries to 
the patent situation is perhaps understandable.  The current 
jurisprudence fundamentally fails to recognize how drug research 
is done.  Pre-clinical testing and the early stage screening of 
compounds to find a lead candidate are part and parcel of 
development and the approval process.  U.S. courts have perhaps 
paid too little attention to the regulatory approval scheme in their 
jurisprudential reasoning.  Given that the FDA requires an 
incredible amount of preclinical research to be done before a new 
drug compound will be approved,211 the courts (with increased 
instruction from Congress) need to recognize and help establish a 
means for keeping this value-added research in the United States.  
Yet, in that endeavor, the courts still need to encourage global 
expansion of the industry and the patent laws and to provide an 
appropriate value for research tool screening patents and 
methodologies.  This seeming Gordian knot is something the 
Supreme Court, perhaps understandably, side-stepped in Merck 
KgaA v. Integra LifeSciences I Ltd.212 
It would be a failure of the patent system if corporate research 
efforts were shunted to offshore sites merely to evade U.S. patent 
infringement.  This costs jobs and hurts the economy.  More 
importantly, the patent laws and the jurisprudence construing them 
should not incentivize companies to locate the most valuable 
intangible aspects of their business outside the United States.  
Congress should pay attention to the public policy considerations 
that have led many other countries to expand the research 
exemption to patent infringement, far beyond that which U.S. 
 
 210 See generally Walsh et al., supra note 26. 
 211 See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
 212 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005); see also supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
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courts have done.  Preferably, the courts or the legislature could do 
this by expanding the breadth of the safe harbor exemption to 
provide a more explicit and useful exemption to patent 
infringement and thereby encourage pharmaceutical companies to 
conduct early stage drug research in the United States. 
Given the inevitability of globalization, a harmonized patent 
regime that encompasses an expanded safe harbor research 
exemption for early stage drug research may well be the remedy.  
Without it, the trend toward exporting research to offshore 
locations could accelerate and the race to the bottom, lowest 
common denominator, will proceed at the great expense of the 
healthcare and economic infrastructure of the United States. 
A. Proposals for Reform 
A broadening of the safe harbor exemption coverage would 
provide enhanced convergence with and predictability in the global 
market.  It would also enable drug companies and other researchers 
to better plan the operations of their businesses and to decide how 
best to conduct such early stage drug research work.  Yet, it would 
still encourage globalization because there would be no artificial 
barriers to the industry and its research. 
The proper scope of the safe harbor exemption to infringement, 
however, cannot be set in a vacuum.  Because a broadened 
exemption will effectively tear down protectionist scaffolding and 
devalue the worth of research tool patents, some accommodation 
must be given to the developers of these important properties.  As 
indicated earlier, research tool companies make important 
contributions to drug research.213 Any market-wide depreciation in 
the value of these tools will reduce the likelihood that the research 
tool industry will grow and this will disadvantage global drug 
development in the long term. 
There are no easy solutions.  Nonetheless, efforts should be 
made to find remedies to treat research tools in a principled, 
cooperative manner, as an alternative to the traditional adversarial 
 
 213 See supra notes 14 and 22 and accompanying text. 
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process of patent infringement litigation.214  Goodwill, for 
example, plays a strong role in multinational companies and could 
be capitalized upon to generate growth and investment in the 
research tool industry.  One prospective remedy could include 
some sort of tax-based incentive for pharmaceutical firms to 
participate in “goodwill” programs that would invest a portion of 
the firms’ revenues in future research and development programs 
at research tool companies.  Such an allocation of revenues would 
benefit that industry as well as the drug industry, which needs 
those tools for ongoing research.   
Large drug companies might well be amenable to such 
programs, when viewed as an opportunity cost.  Rather than 
making tax payments on divested research operations and on the 
subsequent transfers of intangible assets into the U.S., drug 
companies could instead invest that income in a program that 
would fund domestic research tool operations and then receive 
profit-enhancing tax deductions for their investments.  These 
offerings would in turn help compensate the research tool 
companies for their contribution to the early stage research that 
was performed under the safe harbor exemption in the United 
States.  Accordingly, the investment rate of any program could be 
comparable to the royalty payments that the company would have 
made had the research not been exempted from infringement or 
moved offshore.  
This type of a solution would serve to better protect the 
consumer, as the drug research would now be conducted using 
helpful research tools in the United States and thus under the 
assiduous watch of U.S. regulatory agencies.  It would also be 
 
 214 Models in other industries could provide some guidance, for example, the 
compulsory licensing scheme in copyright law, where the government requires users to 
pay royalties into a common fund for the privilege of retransmitting certain copyrighted 
broadcasts. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 111, 119 (2000).  Another model would be Advance Pricing 
Agreements (“APA”) that are used to remedy transfer pricing disputes in tax law.  An 
APA involves a forward contract between the U.S. government and a taxpaying entity 
(e.g., a multinational drug company), by which both parties agree to a transfer pricing 
method for the company’s tax payments in advance.  This allows the company to obtain 
certainty as to part of its future tax burden. See Gustafson et al., TAXATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS 625, 667–681 (West Group Publishing 2001). 
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economically effective, in that the drug industry’s prior use of the 
research tool would contribute to its subsequent value.  Goodwill 
programs could therefore allocate funding in a manner 
commensurate with the worth of the specific tool or company, i.e. 
as a percentage of the present value of the future earnings of the 
drug that was developed, in part, through the use of that tool.215 
B. International Trade Considerations 
However, globalization means that individual measures in 
individual countries cannot affect the value of research tools in the 
global marketplace.  A contextual mechanism would still be 
needed to counter any practice that would stifle the research tool 
industry in the global marketplace.  For example, if U.S. drug 
companies continued to outsource their early stage research after 
an expansion of the safe harbor exemption in order to avoid 
making the appropriate payments to the goodwill programs (or to 
otherwise compensate research tool companies), such a practice 
would thwart the research tool industry.  In this respect, the 
jurisprudence involving unfair competition as regulated by the 
United States International Trade Commission (“ITC”) could be of 
assistance when considering the extent to which information or 
products developed through the use of unfunded research tools 
offshore should be equitably allowed into the United States.  Any 
practice that sought to evade compensating research tool 
companies would not constitute patent infringement but would still 
be fundamentally unfair to the research tool industry.  A claim 
predicated upon such facts would potentially fall within the ITC’s 
jurisdiction. 
The ITC regulates activities of entities that unfairly compete 
with U.S. industries in the United States under the Tariff Act of 
1930.216  Prior to the enactment of 35 U.S.C. § 271(g),217 a U.S. 
 
215 In this manner, the goodwill funding program would resemble an APA in that a 
company could determine the relative value of the tool and weigh it to reflect its relative 
contribution to the overall profitability of the drug company’s business.  Presumably this 
could also be done in advance to allow the drug company to better manage its investment 
burden. 
 216 Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 76-515, 54 Stat. 724 (1930), amended by 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1337(a)(1)(A)(i)–(ii) (1982). 
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patent owner’s only legal recourse was to seek an exclusion order 
for imported products made by its patented process from the ITC 
under the Tariff Act.218  With the emergence of global competition, 
opposition to any perceived U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction for 
unfair trade has waned and the Tariff Act’s reach has broadened.219  
Specifically, section 1337(a)(1)(B)(ii) of the Tariff Act makes it 
unlawful to import into the United States articles that are made, 
produced, processed or mined under or by means of a process 
covered by the claims of a United States patent.220 
The U.S. biotechnology industry has made attempts to seek 
relief from the ITC for acts performed abroad.  In one of a string of 
complaints filed by Amgen with the ITC, Amgen argued that the 
Congressional intent of Tariff Act section 1337(a)(1) was to 
provide assistance to emerging U.S. industries to compete in a 
global marketplace without interference due to unfair acts of 
foreign competitors.221  In this case, Chugai Pharmaceuticals Co. 
Ltd. was using Amgen’s patented intermediates (DNA sequences 
and host cells) outside of the U.S. to import into the U.S. a product, 
EPO, that was made using the patented intermediates.222  To 
remedy the situation, Amgen sought an injunction, based on unfair 
trade practices, to bar the importation and sale of the drug by the 
foreign corporation’s U.S. subsidiary (Chugai U.S.A. Inc.).223 
 
 217 See supra Part III.C., describing infringement through importation. 
 218 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f)(2) provides for injunctive relief, preventing goods from entering 
the United States, and issue cease and desist orders against corporations importing the 
goods.  Unlike 35 U.S.C. § 271(g), the Tariff Act does not provide for an award of 
damages. 
 219 For a general discussion of the effects of globalization on the aggrandizement of the 
U.S.’s jurisdictional reach, see Terry Calvani, Conflict, Cooperation, and Convergence in 
International Competition, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 1127 (2005). 
 220 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2000). 
 221 In the Matter of Certain Recombinant Erythropoietin, 10 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1906 
(U.S.I.T.C. 1989).  Amgen alleged a violation under section 1337(a)(1)(A)(i)–(ii) (1994), 
making unlawful any practice that would destroy or substantially injure an industry in the 
United States; or prevent the establishment of such an industry. Id. at 1907 n.4.  It is 
worth noting that the now thriving field of biotechnology was then in its infancy and 
Amgen was then a small company.  Its EPO product (EPOGEN®) was the biotech 
industry’s first blockbuster and Amgen is now the world’s largest biotech firm and a 
Fortune 500 company. 
 222 Id. at 1908 
 223 Id. at 1907 
HELM_FORMATTED_AUTHEDITS_102706 10/30/2006  11:39:20 AM 
204 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. Vol. 17:153 
 
The ITC dismissed Amgen’s complaint for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction.224  It stated that section 1337 of the Tariff Act 
may be invoked only when process patent claims exist, i.e. those 
that actually describe the processes that Chugai performed 
abroad.225  On appeal, the Federal Circuit likewise held that that 
importation of the drug made from those intermediates was not a 
violation of section 1337(a) because Amgen’s product claims did 
not cover the process performed overseas. 226  The Federal Circuit 
enunciated that section 1337(a) was enacted to prohibit imports 
made using a patented process abroad and not to prohibit imports 
made by a process abroad that employs a patented article.227 
This narrow construction of section 1337(a), however, must be 
considered in the context of the broader intent of the statute, which 
was to prohibit doing offshore that which could not lawfully be 
done in the United States.228  Other provisions of section 1337(a) 
restrict, for example, unfair methods of competition and unfair acts 
in the importation of articles that may restrain or monopolize trade 
or commerce in the United States.229  Currently, if drug companies 
decide to outsource their early stage drug research to avoid patent 
infringement liability, they may well be engaging in the practice of 
unfair trade under such provisions.  Likewise, if drug companies in 
the future decide to outsource their early stage drug research to 
avoid making payments to a research tool funding program or 
agency, they might also then be engaging in the practice of unfair 
trade under such provisions. 
Indeed, the Federal Circuit has expanded the ITC’s jurisdiction 
to potentially adjudicate and impose liability in such cases.  In 
Kinik Co. v. ITC,230 the Federal Circuit affirmed the ITC’s holding 
that the defenses to patent infringement available under section 
271(g) do not apply to infringement actions involving the offshore 
 
 224 Id. at 1911 
 225 Id. at 1909, 1914. 
 226 Amgen, Inc. v. United States Int’l Trade Comm’n., 902 F.2d 1532, 1540 (Fed. Cir. 
1990). 
 227 Id. at 1538. 
 228 Id. at 1539. 
 229 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(A)(iii). 
 230 362 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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practice of a patented process before the ITC.231  The Federal 
Circuit reasoned that a victim of unfair competition should not be 
limited in his or her ability to be remedied by the defenses to 
patent infringement.232  Under this ruling, therefore, research tool 
companies may be able to obtain relief, based on the unfair 
practice of outsourcing early stage drug research to evade either 
research tool patents or future payments to a research tool-funding 
program, upon importation of the products of those processes or 
information developed from them into the United States.  This 
route might thus ultimately provide an equitable remedy to 
counterbalance an expansion of the safe harbor exemption within 
the global marketplace, while still encouraging international 
expansion. 
The bottom line is that the research playing field between the 
U.S. and other countries needs to be leveled.  An increased 
harmonization of patent laws on a global scale will serve to 
increase the value of all patents and, in turn, increase the incentive 
to innovate and to disclose new technologies and inventions, so as 
to ultimately enhance technological innovation in this country and 
around the world.  This was the rationale put forth in the early 
1980’s to support the creation of the Federal Circuit.233  Indeed, 
throughout its existence the Federal Circuit has repeatedly invoked 
its congressional mandate of promoting “national patent law 
uniformity” and has expansively interpreted and defined its 
jurisdiction in furtherance of that goal.234  U.S. patents are worth 
more today as a result of this change.235 
This rationale should thus be used again to achieve a globalized 
application of the patent laws to reduce the uncertainty regarding, 
inter alia, the scope of enforceability of research tool patents and 
to increase the indelible value of innovation in a global market.  
 
 231 See generally Richard L. Rainey & Paul M. Schoenhard, Tariff Act and Imports of 
Products Manufactured by Patented Processes, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY-USA, June 14, 
2004. 
 232 Kinik Co., 362 F.3d at 1362. 
 233 See e.g., SCHWARTZ, supra note 17, at 5. 
 234 See Gerald J. Flattmann, Jr. & Krista M. Rycroft, Is Uniformity in Patent Law Still 
Achievable?, N.Y. L.J., May 12, 2003, at S6. 
 235 Id. 
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This increased certainty will also serve to sustain the growth of 
pharmaceutical research in the United States, and will embrace the 
integration of information across borders.  A broader read of the 
safe harbor exemption to patent infringement and to unfair 
competition laws (in view of future research tool funding 
mechanisms) will give pharmaceutical companies the ability to 
capitalize upon their intangible business assets while allowing 
scientific innovation to continue in the United States. 
